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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal and cross appeal are taken pursuant to Rule 4 of
the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure seeking review of the Order
and Judgment of the Seventh Judicial District Court of Emery County
dated November 30, 1992. This cross appeal is taken pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(f) and (j) (1988).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The issues presented on this appeal and cross-appeal are:
1.

Whether the Plaintiff has failed to meet its burden of

marshalling the evidence and showing that the findings of fact
entered by the trial court are clearly erroneous.
2.

Whether the trial court was correct in finding that the

royalty rate called for by the State coal lease held by Plaintiff
was 8% of value.
3. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to apply the
interest rate and late fee penalties prescribed by the rules and
regulations of the Board of State Lands and Forestry to the
delinquent royalties owed by Plaintiff.
4.

Whether the trial court ruled correctly that Plaintiff

must pay to the State the royalty called for in a state coal lease
on coal Plaintiff mined, sold, and was paid for, before Plaintiff
submitted the assignment of its lease for approval to the Division
of State Lands and Forestry.
5.

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the statute

of limitations does not prevent the State as trustee of school

trust lands from collecting full value for coal mined and sold by
Plaintiff under the state coal lease.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
The arguments raised by Plaintiff are premised on a version of
facts different from the facts found by the trial court. This case
involves the interpretation of a state coal lease on which the
court received extrinsic evidence regarding the prevailing royalty
rate paid by lessees on coal leases issued by the United States,
the intent of the parties, and the interpretation of the royalty
clause in the state lease.

In such a case the standard of review

is strictly limited to whether, after marshalling all of the
evidence in support of the trial court's findings, the findings are
based on substantial, competent, admissible evidence.

50 W.

Broadway v. Redevelopment Agency, 784 P.2d 1162 (Ut. 1989) and
Prudential Capital Group v. Mattson, 802 P.2d 104 (Ut. App. 1990).
The cross appeal challenges Conclusions of Law No's 17, 18,
and 19 relating to which interest rate should apply.

Those are

reviewed

P. 2d 198

for correctness.

Saunders v.

Sharp, 806

(Ut.1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES, AND REGULATIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

(Full text in Addendum 5)

Utah Enabling Act, § 6

Utah Const. Art. X, § 5

Utah Enabling Act, § 10

Utah Const. Art. XX, § 1

2

STATUTES
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-1 (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-18(3) (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-23 (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-76 (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-97 (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 65A-l-2(3) (1953 as amended)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(f) and (j) (1988)
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-23(2)

REGULATIONS
30 C.F.R. § 203.200(g)
30 C.F.R. § 211.63(b)
Rule 3(c) (2) of the Rules and Regulations Governing The Issuance
of Mineral Leases of the Utah State Board of State Lands and
Forestry dated November 4, 1982
Rule 3(C) (2) of the Rules and Regulations Governing The Issuance
of Mineral Leases of the Utah State Board of State Lands and
Forestry dated December 26, 1983
Rule M2a2(5) (f) of the Rules and Regulations Governing The
Issuance of Mineral Leases of the Utah State Board of State Lands
and Forestry dated July 1, 1986

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Nature of the Case
This case involves a State coal lease held by the Plaintiff on
school trust lands (Addendum 4) . School trust lands were given to
the State of Utah, by the Federal Government, to provide a base to
generate income for the benefit of the public school system. Utah
Enabling Act § 6 and § 10, Utah Const. Art. X, § 5 and Art. XX, §
1.
The lease required payment of royalties at the rate of 15
cents per ton of coal produced and sold or
at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of
the quarter for which payment is being made,
for federal lessees of land of similar
character under coal leases issued by the
United States at that time, whichever is
higher.... (emphasis added).
(Exhibit 1).
The Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry (hereinafter
referred to as "Division" or "State") audited the payments and
concluded that Plaintiff, which paid the lower rate, had underpaid
the royalty.

Demand was made on October 15, 1985, that Plaintiff

pay the higher royalty found by the audit to have been proper
(Exhibit 6 ) . Plaintiff appealed the decision of the auditors to
the Director of the Division of State Lands and Forestry.

The

Director, after a hearing, upheld the audit and the demand for
payment.

4

B. Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff then filed this action in the Seventh Judicial
District Court asking for a declaration that the State not collect
the unpaid royalties. Plaintiff filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment.

The trial court granted Plaintiff's Motion for Partial

Summary Judgment, finding that Plaintiff owed nothing to the State.
Defendants appealed the trial court's ruling to the Utah Supreme
Court which vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the trial
court with instructions on a number of issues.

Plateau Mining v.

Utah Division of State Lands, 802 P. 2d 720 (Ut. 1990), (hereinafter
Plateau).

The Supreme Court in Plateau stated that the law

regarding trust lands governs the issues in this case (Id. at 72 3)
and that to determine the intent of the original parties to the
lease, the trial court must first look to the document itself (Id.
at 725).

It then instructed the trial court to find what federal

royalty rate was prevailing for federal lessees of federal leases
issued at that time (Id. at 726) .

The Supreme Court then said

that the alternative rate provision provides a practical method of
determining the correct royalty and that the State had the right to
rely on the lessee to determine and pay the correct royalty (Id. at
72 6-27).

Finally, it said that the State must receive full value

for the trust assets (Id. at 729).
C. Disposition at Trial Court
On remand, after a three day trial, the trial court found that
8% of value, (approximately $2.00 per ton) was the only rate for
5

federal lessees of federal coal leases issued during the audit
period (1979 to 1984), and was therefore the applicable prevailing
rate

and

the

rate

which

applied

to

the

Plaintiff's

lease.

Plaintiff had paid royalties at the rate of 15 cents per ton. The
trial court awarded judgment against Plaintiff for the unpaid
royalties and interest at the statutory rate of 6% per annum.

It

is from that decision that Plaintiff takes this appeal.
The State filed a cross appeal claiming the State is entitled
to interest at the rates established by the rules and regulations
adopted by the Board of State Lands and Forestry, (hereinafter
"Board") rather than the statutory rate of 6%.

PACTS
Defendants dispute the facts used

in Plaintiff's Brief.

Plaintiff's Statement of the Issues is premised on a set of facts
not found to be true by the trial court nor supported by the
evidence. Defendants set forth here the facts as stipulated by the
parties in the Second Amended Pre-Trial Order and those found by
the trial court.
The State of Utah and Plaintiff are parties to Utah State Coal
Lease #22603 (Addendum 4, Stipulated Fact No. 3, Finding of Fact
No. 1, Exhibit 1) . The land, which was subject to the coal lease,
was granted to the State of Utah by the United States under the
Utah Enabling Act for the support of the common schools (Stipulated
Fact No. 5, Finding of Fact No. 3, Utah Enabling Act § 6). These
6

lands are managed by the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry
under policies, rules, and regulations established by the Board of
State Lands and Forestry (Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-23) .

The lease

required, and the Plaintiff covenanted and agreed to pay, royalty,
quarterly on the coal mined (a) at the rate of 15 cents per ton of
coal produced from the leased premises or
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the
quarter for which payment is being made, for federal
lessees of land of similar character under coal leases
issued by the United States at that time whichever is
higher . . . . (emphasis added).
(Stipulated Fact No. 8, Finding of Fact No. 2, Exhibit 1),
at 727-28.

Plateau

Plaintiff paid the State a 15 cent per ton royalty on

all of the coal extracted from State Coal Lease ML 22603 beginning
in July 1979

(Exhibit 2, Stipulated Fact No's 13, 31, Record

(hereinafter R.) 672).
The

lease was originally

issued

to Malcolm

McKinnon on

February 8, 1965 (Exhibit 1, Stipulated Fact No. 3). The Estate of
Malcolm McKinnon assigned the lease to Myron Fetterolf (of the
Fetterolf Group, Inc.) on July 11, 1979 (Exhibit 66, Stipulated
Fact No. 11) .

Trail Mountain was owned by the Fetterolf Group,

Inc., a Pennsylvania Corporation, 80%; John L. Bell, 18%; and
Charles A. Bass, 2% (R. 667).

Trail Mountain Coal Company was

involved with the State Lease from the time it was issued to
Malcolm McKinnon and was the only party to extract coal from the
State Lease and pay royalties on that coal (Exhibit 2, Stipulated
Fact No. 9, R. 666, 668, 676).
7

On August 13, 1979, the Plaintiff entered into an "Agreement
of Sublease" with Inez Lou Fetterolf, Executrix of the Estate of
Myron F. Fetterolf (Exhibit 95, included herewith in Addendum 8, R.
667) .

As compensation

for entering

into this "Agreement of

Sublease," the Fetterolf Group, Inc., was to be paid an 8%
overriding royalty by Trail Mountain for the coal produced from the
lease (Exhibit 95, p. 1). For the coal produced during the audit
period, that calculates to an 8% overriding royalty of THREE
MILLION NINE HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTEEN
DOLLARS AND FOUR CENTS ($3,925,817.04). By contrast, the State was
paid 15 cents per ton royalty or TWO HUNDRED NINETY-FOUR THOUSAND
TWO HUNDRED ONE DOLLARS AND FIFTY-THREE CENTS ($294,201.53) for all
of the coal produced by Trail Mountain during the audit period
(1979 to 1984) (Exhibits 2, 5). Neither the Board nor the Division
was informed or made aware of the existence of the "Agreement of
Sublease" (R. 668).
On January 26, 1981, the Estate of Myron F. Fetterolf formally
assigned the leasehold's interest under the State Coal Lease to
Trail Mountain Coal Company (Exhibit 69, Stipulated Fact No. 16).
Fetterolf was to be paid FOUR MILLION DOLLARS ($4,000,000) for this
assignment in addition to the 8% overriding royalty previously
reserved in the "Agreement of Sublease" (Exhibits 68, 70).
When the lease was issued by the State on February 8, 1965,
the royalty rate set by the Federal Government on its coal leases
was generally fifteen cents per ton, the amount set forth in part
8

(a) of the State coal lease royalty provision (Stipulated Fact No.
56, Finding of Fact No. 9 ) .
In August of 1976, the federal law changed with the enactment
of the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments Act (FCLAA).

Once the

regulations implementing the new law were in place, eight percent
(8%) was the royalty rate set by the Federal Government for coal
mined by underground methods during the audit period (1979 to 1984)
(Stipulated Facts No's 59, 61, Finding of Fact No's 10, 14, R. 1826
and Exhibit 4 ) . From January 1977 until the time of the trial,
there were 177 federal coal leases issued or readjusted in Utah.
All but 5 were issued at a royalty rate of 8% (R. 1826-27).
of those

five had

royalty

rates higher

than

Four

8% due to an

experimental situation existing for a very short time as the new
law was implemented (Exhibit 4, Finding of Fact No. 16, R. 182728) . There were eighty (80) federal coal leases issued or adjusted
in Utah during the audit period. In addition to those eighty (80) ,
there were twenty-five (25) federal coal leases under appeal for
readjustment to an 8% royalty (Exhibit 4, Stipulated Fact No. 62).
Those appeals were resolved in favor of the Federal Government with
the leases being readjusted to 8% (R. 1843, Exhibit 4).
Each time the Board of State Lands and Forestry addressed the
royalty provision of its coal lease form from 1975 forward, it
found that federal coal lease royalty rates were 8% for underground
coal.

At its monthly meeting on April

19, 1973, the Board

instructed the Division staff to begin reviewing its lease forms
9

starting with the coal lease form

(Exhibit 29) .

The staff

contacted the United States Geological Survey and learned that the
Federal Government was working on changes to its leasing policy and
acknowledged that the federal royalty rate for underground mined
coal was 4% at that time (Exhibit 29) .

At the Board meeting on

August 21, 1975, the Division staff reported that contact with
organizations involved in the coal industry, both in the public and
private sector, revealed that 8% was the federal coal lease royalty
rate (Exhibit 49) . This rate was incorporated into every new State
coal lease issued thereafter (Exhibit 49) . At the Board meeting on
May 18, 1977, the Board readjusted several coal leases and set the
royalty at 8% (Exhibit 38).

The minutes of the July 8, 1981

meeting of the Board of State Lands and Forestry reflect that
current lease forms carry an 8% production royalty (Exhibit 87).
Plaintiff was aware of the provisions of the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder
which fixed the royalty rate at which federal coal leases mined by
underground methods were issued at 8% and surface mined coal at
12.5% (Exhibit 99, Stipulated Fact No. 63, R. 1969).

Plaintiff

held several federal coal leases in Utah (Stipulated Fact No's 69,
75).

Plaintiff's Federal Coal Lease U 082996 is located in the

Trail Mountain mine as is the State Coal Lease (Stipulated Fact No.
69) .

This federal coal lease was issued on July 1, 1962 and

modified to add an additional 40 acre tract on January 18, 1980
(Stipulated Fact No's 70, 72). This modification, which occurred
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very early in the audit period, included an 8% royalty for the
additional tract (Stipulated Fact No. 72).

Plaintiff's Federal

Coal Lease U 49332 was issued February 18, 1983 and is also located
in the Trail Mountain mine (Stipulated Fact No. 75). This lease
required an 8% royalty (Stipulated Fact No. 75) .

Despite being

aware that the Federal Government was charging 8% royalties on its
coal leases, (Stipulated Fact No's 61, 63), Plaintiff continued to
pay 15 cents per ton royalty for all coal produced from the State
Coal Lease (Stipulated Fact No. 31, Exhibit 5).
In 1985 the State audited the royalty payments submitted by
the Plaintiff (and other coal lessees) and concluded that Plaintiff
should have paid, and be paying, royalty at the rate of 8% as
required under part (b) of the lease royalty provision (Stipulated
Fact No's 41, 42, 43, Finding of Fact No. 5, Exhibit 6).
During the audit period the same royalty rate was being
charged by the Federal Government for coal leases in Utah on all
land in the State whether they were in the same mine, the same
canyon, or the same area. The only distinction regarding character
of land or coal was whether the mine was surface or underground.
In this case it was an underground mine (Finding of Fact No. 16, R.
1830).
During the time Trail Mountain Coal Company mined TWO MILLION
TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED

EIGHTY EIGHT AND THIRTY THREE ONE

HUNDREDTHS (2,002,188.33) tons of the State's coal from State Coal
Lease ML 22603, (Exhibit 5) the accounting manager and person
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responsible for paying royalties on behalf of Plaintiff, never read
the

lease

(R. 1970-71) .

It was not until

1983

when

Diamond

Shamrock became involved with the State Lease that the lease was
read for the first time (R. 1988-90, 2014-15).

Trail Mountain was

paid FORTY-NINE MILLION SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTEEN
DOLLARS AND FIFTY-SIX CENTS ($49,072,713.56) for the coal (Exhibit
5) •

The contracts for the sale of the coal provided for Trail

Mountain to be reimbursed for an 8% royalty plus transportation
expenses incurred in the mining of the coal (Exhibits 97, P. 8; 98,
P. 7 ) . Trail Mountain paid the Fetterolf Group, Inc. FOUR MILLION
DOLLARS

($4,000,000)

(Exhibit 68, P. 1) plus an 8% overriding

royalty

(Exhibits 70, 95) which amounts to THREE MILLION NINE

HUNDRED TWENTY-FIVE THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTEEN DOLLARS AND
FOUR CENTS

($3,925,817.04

) for the State Coal Lease.

Despite

these facts, Trail Mountain argues it should only have to pay TWO
HUNDRED NINETY-FOUR THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED ONE DOLLARS AND FIFTYTHREE CENTS ($294,201.53) (.6%
FORTY-NINE MILLION

(six-tenths of one percent) of the

SEVENTY-TWO

THOUSAND

SEVEN

HUNDRED

THIRTEEN

DOLLARS AND FIFTY-SIX CENTS ($49,072,713.56) it received for the
coal) to the school trust.
After a three-day trial, the Court found that Plaintiff, by
reasonable

inquiry,

could

have

established

the

fact

that

the

applicable prevailing federal rate was 8% of the value of the coal
produced and the evidence showed that Trail Mountain paid 15 cents
per ton for years without ever reading the lease or making any
12

inquiry as to the applicable rate (Finding of Fact No's 12, 13, R.
1970, 1988-90, 2014-15, Exhibit 5). The Court awarded pre-judgment
interest finding that the amount of royalty owed by Plaintiff to
the school trust can be mathematically determined by multiplying
the value of the coal by the royalty rate of eight percent (8%)
(Finding of Fact No. 19) . Judgment was entered in the sum of THREE
MILLION SIX HUNDRED THIRTY ONE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED FIFTEEN DOLLARS
AND FIFTY-THREE CENTS

($3,631,615.53) in delinquent

royalties

together with interest on each delinquent payment from the date
each payment became due (Finding of Fact No. 20).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I.

THE LAW RELATING TO SCHOOL TRUST LANDS PROVIDES THE BACKGROUND
FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES IN THIS CASE.
As a condition of statehood, many states, particularly in the

West, were given certain lands to hold in trust to generate income
for the benefit of the public schools.

These lands were to be

managed such that the state, as trustee, received full value for
the trust assets.

As trust assets, trust funds must be protected

against

diversion.

loss

or

State

constitutions,

statutes,

agreements, and court-imposed rules are subordinate to and must not
interfere with the accomplishment of trust purposes.

Doubts

relating to questions of fact and law are to be resolved in favor
of preserving the trust assets for trust purposes.
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II.

THE ARGUMENTS IN PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ARE BA8ED ON A VERSION OF
FACTS REJECTED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE.
The trial court had a considerable body of evidence before it

including a stipulation of facts by the parties and made findings
and conclusions which are supported by that evidence.

Plaintiff

has not met its burden to show that the court's findings of fact
are not supported by the evidence, but instead bases its arguments
on facts contrary to those found by the court.

III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD PAY
ROYALTY ON ALL COAL PRODUCED AND SOLD BY IT FROM THE LEASED
PROPERTY INCLUDING THAT PRODUCED BEFORE SUBMITTING ITS REQUEST
FOR APPROVAL OF THE ASSIGNMENT.
Trail Mountain was the one and only party to mine coal from
the State Coal Lease.

It was the only party to pay royalties to

the State for that coal.

Trail Mountain's involvement with the

State Lease began long before the audit period.
Sublease

was

actually

an

assignment.

The Agreement of

Given

these

facts,

Plaintiff's contention, that the State's claims for delinquent
royalties for the period prior to the lease assignment and approval
in 1981, are without merit.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT'S CONCLUSION THAT A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS
NOT TO BE APPLIED TO DEPRIVE THE STATE OF FULL VALUE FOR THE
COAL TAKEN BY PLAINTIFF WAS CORRECT.
The relationship between the State of Utah and Trail Mountain

Coal Company obligated Trail Mountain to pay the correct royalties
14

to the State.
to

deprive

Statutes of limitation should not apply in this case

the

beneficiaries

benefits of the trust.

of

trust

lands

of

the

intended

If a statute of limitation does apply, it

has not run in this case because it would commence upon the last
payment since this is an open, current, and mutual account and the
statute of limitations does not start until the final payment.
Finally, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-2 provides a seven year statute of
limitations rather than the six year statute of limitations urged
by Plaintiff in the event any statute of limitations is applicable.

V.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST,
BUT IT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING INTEREST AT THE RATE PROVIDED BY
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BOARD OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY,
Interest and penalties on delinquent royalty payments are

proper and necessary to preserve the trust assets. The proper rate
of interest to be applied to the delinquent royalty payments is the
rate adopted by the Board of State Lands and Forestry, not the
lower statutory rate.
VI.

THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO AWARD TO PLAINTIFF A
DEDUCTION AGAINST ROYALTIES DUE FOR CLAIMED TRANSPORTATION
EXPENSES.
The

State Coal

Lease

form does not allow deductions

production or operational expenses such as transportation.

for
The

Federal Government, from which the State adopts its royalty rate
but not its entire royalty calculation method, does not "mandate"
deductions for transportation expenses.
15

Trail Mountain did not

show a transportation deduction on any of its report forms for
federal coal extracted from the same mine.
claimed

deduction

would

constitute

a

The allowance of the
double

deduction

for

transportation cost since sales contracts for the coal provided for
a credit against sales price upon which the state royalty is
calculated.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE LAW RELATING TO SCHOOL TRUST LANDS PROVIDES THE BACKGROUND
FOR THE APPLICATION OF THE GOVERNING PRINCIPLES IN THIS CASE,
The State Coal Lease is located on land granted to the State

of Utah for the benefit of the public school system.
these

lands

from

the

Federal

Government, the

In accepting
State

in

its

Constitution covenanted to hold these lands in trust for the
purposes for which they were granted. Therefore, the Enabling Act,
the Constitution of Utah, and the body of case law known as trust
land law, govern the issues in this case.
A,

General Trust Land Law

Beginning with the case of Trustees of Vincennes University v.
State of Indiana, 55 U.S. 268 (1852), the United States Supreme
Court has consistently held that a state holds school lands in
trust for the benefit of its schools. Congress and the courts have
placed protections on the use of the trust lands so that they are
not exploited for private advantage or depleted by state action or
inaction.

Lassen v. Arizona, 385 U.S. 458 (1967).
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The duty of the State in managing mineral rights on trust
lands is to obtain full value for the trust assets:
The royalty rate set by the state is important because it
represents payment for a trust asset which will be gone
forever once the mineral is removed from the ground.
Therefore, the requirements of the Enabling Act and the
trust concept are the most important factors to consider
in determining an optimum royalty rate. If the rate is
too low the state will be committing a breach of trust by
diminishing the trust. Royalty payments are placed in a
permanent trust fund, the corpus of which is invested;
the trust is kept whole if fair market value is received.
If the royalty rate is too low the trust will not be kept
whole.
State School Trust Lands and Oil and Gas Royalty Rates, Public Land
Law Review, 119 (1982).

See Utah Code Ann. § 65A-l-2(3), See also

Andrus v. Utah. 446 U.S. 500 (1980) and Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58
Ut. 418, 199 P.2d 670, (Ut. 1921); Plateau at 729 (stating that
less than full value undermines the trust); Lassen v. Arizona, 385
U.S.

458,

(1967)

(declaring

that

the

state

is

required

to

compensate the trust for full value for land taken by the state for
a highway improvement); Kadish v. Arizona State Land Department,
747

P.2d

1183,

(Ariz. 1987),

aff.

109

S.

Ct.

2037

(1989),

(forbidding the issuance of mineral leases without payment of full
value and declaring invalid lease agreements entered into by the
state at a fixed royalty rate of less than full value); Department
of State Lands v. Pettibone, 702 P.2d 948 (Mont. 1985) (holding
that the trust could not be divested of water rights without full
value compensation); State of Alaska v. University of Alaska, 624
P.2d 807 (Ak. 1981) (declared that the trust must receive full
17

value for land placed in a state park) ; Anderson v. Nebraska Board
of Education, 256 N.W.2d 318 (Neb. 1977) (the duty of the trustee
is to obtain maximum return to the trust estate in requiring state
to accept late bid at an auction); State v. Phillips Petroleum
Company. 258 P.2d 1193 (Ok. 1953) (state clerk could not by mistake
grant minerals located on trust land as it is state's duty as
trustee to receive full value); Oklahoma Education Assoc. Inc. v.
Niah, 642 P. 2d 230 (Ok. 1982) (striking down a statute which
allowed low interest loans from trust funds since it is trustee's
duty to obtain the maximum benefit for the trust); State v.
Northwest Maanesite Company, 182 P.2d 643 (Wash. 1947) (a land
commissioner could not allow by agreement the taking of trust
assets for less than full value); and Caffall v. Washington, 484
P.2d 912 (Wash. 1971) (in declining to transfer trust lands to the
highest bidder at an auction ruled that the public is entitled to
the best possible bargain for the sale of trust assets).
Plaintiff's argument, that the State urges the adoption of a
position outside the "reach of ordinary legal principles" (Brief of
Appellant at 36) , ignores the huge body of law previously cited
that stands for the proposition that when dealing with school trust
lands, the State's duty is prescribed by the State Constitution
and acceptance of the lands from the United States.

In Caffall.

Supra, the Supreme Court of Washington rejected the argument that
the state must not expect more favorable treatment than is fair
between men.

Id. at 916.

Ordinary rules simply don't apply to
18

situations involving trust lands. The Supreme Court of Montana in
Department

of

State

Lands v.

Pettibone, Supra,

stated

that

"[s]chool trust lands are subject to a different set of rules than
other public lands."

Id. at 955. See also Kadish, Supra.

To enforce the important trust purposes, the courts have
consistently

rejected

any

state

statutes,

constitutional

provisions, and court-imposed doctrines that restrict the state
from obtaining full value from trust lands. Plaintiff argues that
the obligations inherent to the administration of trust lands stop
when the State receives at least the "agreed price" for trust
assets (Brief of Appellant at 35).

Such a position is simply not

supported by the numerous courts which have addressed the issue.
The Kadish Court noted that federal law is supreme in this field
and that
[n]either this court, nor the legislature, nor the people
may alter or amend the trust provisions contained in the
Enabling Act without congressional approval.
Jd. at 1185. It analyzed the court cases dealing with this subject
and pointed out that:
[t]he courts have consistently construed the scope of
federal land grants in favor of the government.
In
dealing with trust land... all doubts must be resolved in
favor of protecting and preserving trust purposes.
Id. at 1195. The Supreme Court of Washington addressed this issue
in County of Skamania v. Washington, 685 P.2d 576 (Wash. 1984). In
striking down a state law that allowed timber lessees to take trust
assets for less than full value, the court stated "We think the Act
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falls far short of the state's constitutionally imposed duty to
seek "full value" for trust assets."

Id. at 582.

B. Utah Enabling Act
Utah is one of thirty (30) public land states whose Enabling
Act granted lands to be used for the support of schools and
institutions.
1981].

L. Mall, Public Land and Mining Law, 44-47 [3 Ed.

The Utah Enabling Act granted to the State four (4)

sections of land in each township for the support of the common
schools.

Utah Enabling Act § 6.

Section 10 of the Enabling Act

provided that the lands granted shall constitute a permanent school
fund, the interest of which only should be expended for the support
of schools.
C

Utah Constitution

The State of Utah, in its Constitution, accepted those lands
granted to the State in the Enabling Act, in trust for the
respective purposes for which they had been granted.
of Utah, Art. XX, § 1.

Constitution

In doing so, the State of Utah agreed and

covenanted that
(A) the land and its proceeds would be held in trust for
the support of the common schools, Utah Enabling Act, §
6, Constitution of Utah, Article XX, § 1
(B) the State would establish a school trust fund,
Constitution of Utah, Article X, § 5, and
(C) the State would hold the trust harmless from loss or
diversion. Constitution of Utah, Article X, § 5 (amended
effectively July 1, 1987 with Section 5 becoming Sections
5 and 7.)
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The effect of the Utah Enabling Act and the Constitution of Utah on
school trust lands is that the lands are held in a binding,
permanent trust to generate financial aid to support the public
school system.

Utah v. Kleppe. 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978)

reversed on other around 446 U.S. 500 (1980). Actions which result
in the trust not receiving full return on its assets are not to be
upheld or supported by the court. Plateau at 729. The trustee is
required to obtain full value for leases of school trust land and
the assets are guaranteed by the State against loss or diversion.
Plateau;

Van Wagoner.

D. The State Of Utah's Performance Of Its Responsibility As
Trustee.
In order to perform its trust responsibilities, the State
established the Board of State Lands and Forestry and charged it
with the responsibility of managing the state's trust lands. Utah
Code Ann. § 65-1-1 et seq. The Utah Legislature provided that the
form of all mineral leases and other relevant instruments are to be
prescribed by the Board (Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-18(3)), and provided
that the Board shall, by rules and regulations, prescribe the
amount of royalty and the basis upon which the royalty shall be
computed, with such other details as may be necessary in the
interest of the State. Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-2 3, and Utah Code Ann.
§ 65-1-76, also require the approval of the Attorney General on all
leases and contracts before they are executed by the Board.
The Board has full power and authority to prescribe the
21

necessary rules and regulations to accomplish the purposes and
objectives for which it was established.

Utah Code Ann.§ 65-1-1,

§ 65-1-23, § 65-1-97; See also, McKniaht v. State Land Board, 381
P.2d

726,

(Ut. 1963).

The Boardfs

responsibilities

include

managing the public lands in the most prudent and profitable
manner.

The Board is, therefore, given discretion in setting

policies and rules that carry out those responsibilities.
v. Utah State Land Board. 403 P.2d 781 (Ut. 1965).

Colman

When the

statutory requirements are not met there is no contract binding
upon the State. Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d 695 (Ut.
1976).
Lessees of school trust lands take leases with notice of and
subject to the law and the trust responsibilities of the state.
State v. Board of Educational Lands and Funds, 65 N.W.2d 392 (Neb.
1954).

Because the lease at issue involves trust lands, it is

clear that the law regarding trust lands governs this case.
II.

THE ARGUMENT8 IN PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF ARE BASED ON A VERSION OF
FACTS REJECTED BY THE TRIAL COURT AND CONTRARY TO THE
EVIDENCE.
A. The Trial Court's Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law
Are Proper And Are Supported By The Evidence.
The trial court, in reaching its decision, had the ruling of

the Utah Supreme Court in Plateau, the Second Amended Pre-Trial
Order containing 77 paragraphs of stipulated facts, 109 exhibits,
and testimony from numerous witnesses over the course of a three
day trial.

Under Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure:
22

Findings of fact, whether based on oral or documentary
evidence, shall not be set aside unless clearly
erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the
opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility
of the witnesses.
See also, Grayson Roper Ltd. v. Finlinson, 782 P.2d 467 (Ut.
1989).
The trial

court made

Plaintiff's brief.

findings on the

issues raised

in

The trial court, however, did not make the

findings Plaintiff wanted.

Plaintiff, instead of marshalling the

facts that support the trial court's findings and then showing that
there was not evidence sufficient to support those findings, as it
is required to do, relies on its own version of the facts in
arguing that the trial court erred.

Plaintiff's version of the

facts is established by making statements which are not supported
by the record and taken out of context.
Plaintiff's claim, that the trial court's rulings on the
interpretation of the lease royalty provision rewrite and delete
key

phrases

(Brief

of

Appellant

at

27) , is without merit.

Plaintiff mischaracterizes the trial court's findings to say that
it deleted from the lease language the phrase "land of similar
character."

On the contrary, the Court found that the Federal

Government had only two classifications of coal leases: surface and
underground.

The rate for federal lessees would be 8% for

underground coal regardless of the character of the land (R. 1677) .
The evidence established

and the trial court ruled that the

interpretation arrived at during the audit incorporates all of the
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lease language; it does not delete or rewrite any of the phrases of
the lease royalty provision (R. 1675-78).
Plaintiff

makes

the

bold

claim

that

contrary

to

the

instruction of the Supreme Court,
The Court did not inquire how the Board and the Division
had construed "land of similar character" or what meaning
the State had given to the "rate prevailing" on federal
leases "issued by the United States at that time."
(State Lease, Trial Exhibit 1)
Instead, the court
announced that the "different interpretations" that could
be placed on such clauses were "not important."
(R.
1677). (Brief of Appellant at 17-18).
The above cited reference to the record (R. 1677) is page four of
the court's Memorandum Decision.

The court did not say that

"different interpretations" that could be placed on such clauses
were "not important."

The court's ruling, in context, is as

follows:
Since this rate was being charged by the federal
government on all its coal land in the state of Utah,
except for a very few isolated exceptions that were made
because
of
specific
application,
the
different
interpretations that could be placed on "land of similar
character" ceases to be a problem. The same federal rate
was being charged whether the land was within the same
mine, the same canyon, or the same area. That provision
under
these
circumstances,
had
no
particular
significance.
Since the rate fixed by the federal government was
almost universally applied during the audit, the question
of whether it applied to lessees of land issued prior to
or at the time of the beginning of the quarter when the
payment was to be made likewise is not important since
the same rate applies to both situations.
(Memorandum Decision at 4 which is R. 1677).
Plaintiff makes another reference to this portion of the trial
court's

Memorandum

Decision

in
24

stating

"Accordingly,

it

is

necessary to give some meaning to "coal leases issued by the United
States at that time" (State Lease, Trial Exhibit 1 ) ; the phrase
simply cannot be dismissed (or deleted) as "not important" (R.
1677)"

(Brief of Appellant at 31, 32).

The text of R. 1677

referred to above, demonstrates that the court did not dismiss any
phrase as Plaintiff contends.
B. Plaintiff's Claim That The Intent Of The Drafters Of The
Utah
State
Lease
For
Coal And
The
Administrative
Interpretations And Instructions Are Contrary To The Findings
And Conclusions Of The Court Is Not Supported By The Evidence,
Plaintiff argues that the trial court's findings ignore the
original intent of the drafters of the lease and the interpretation
by the State of the royalty provision (Brief of Appellant at 22).
Both Charles Henderson and Donald Gail Prince, whose testimony
Plaintiff claims is ignored by the Court, appeared as witnesses in
support of the State. The court's findings relating to the meaning
of the royalty provision in the lease are consistent with the
testimony of Henderson and Prince. The trial court found (a) that
the intent of the drafters of the lease was to fix the royalty
payment equal to, or the same as, that being paid to the federal
government on coal leases on federal land,

(Memorandum Decision p.

2 which is R. 1675, Finding of Fact No. 8), see Henderson and
Prince, transcript pages 88 which is R. 1854, 91-92 which are R.
1857-58; 95 which is R. 1861; 97 which is R. 1863; 150 which is R.
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1915,

154 which

1918A1;

is R.

(b) that Plaintiff had the

obligation under the lease to determine and pay the correct
royalty, but the only effort made by Plaintiff was, without even
reading the lease (R. 1988-90, 1970), to talk to employees of the
Division as to its understanding (Memorandum Decision p. 5 which is
R. 1678, Finding of Fact No. 17) , and that was done only after many
years of mining the coal from the lease (R. 1979-83) and paying 15
cents per ton, (Exhibits 5, 11) ;

(c) Plaintiff could have, by

reasonable inquiry, established the prevailing rate (Memorandum
Decision p.3, which is R. 1676, Finding of Fact No. 12), and (d)
there is no injustice in requiring Plaintiff to pay the royalty
called for in the lease (Memorandum Decision p. 7 which is R. 1680,
Conclusion of Law No. 14).
Plaintiff argues that the State previously interpreted the
lease to require the payment of a 15 cent per ton royalty (Brief of
Appellant at 11) .

In making this argument, Plaintiff relies

heavily on the testimony of Ralph Miles to support the proposition
that there was an "intent and interpretation" (Brief of Appellant
at 16).

Upon close scrutiny, Mr. Miles1 testimony really says that

he was unaware of any official interpretation (R. 2124-25).
other

State

witnesses

said

the

royalty

provision

was

All
never

officially interpreted until the audit (R. 2103, 1861-62, 1902-06).

As Plaintiff noted in its brief, page 154 of the trial transcript does not bear a record number. For
the Court's convenience, we will use the same numbering convention as did the Plaintiff.
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claim that the

State's present or new interpretation requires the payment of the
"highest royalty currently charged" for "new" federal leases (Brief
of Appellant at 3) ignores the facts in evidence that 8% is not the
highest royalty rate charged by the federal government, but rather
it is the only rate for which federal coal leases were issued and
is therefore the prevailing rate during the audit period.
Plaintiff contends that 8% became the prevailing rate on July
1, 1983 when it was issued its federal coal lease at 8% (Brief of
Appellant at 24) •

If that were true, one should ask why didn't

Plaintiff begin paying the State an 8% royalty at that time?
Plaintiff further claims that the Federal Government has authority
to issue its leases below 8% (Brief of Appellant at 28) . The State
concedes that such may be the law but points to the evidence that
the United States, although authorized to do so, as a matter of
policy did not issue leases for less than 8%.

The lease document

in question refers to the rate paid by "federal lessees" and
qualifies federal lessees as those "under coal leases issued by the
United States," (emphasis added) not coal leases which might have
been issued (Exhibit 1).
The Plaintiff's repeated contention that all federal leases
need to be counted to determine the prevailing federal rate in the
"same area" or "same mine" is simply a smoke screen, since the
prevailing rate was the same nationwide (R. 1823-25). Furthermore,
the leases issued in the same mine or same area during the audit
period carried an 8% royalty (Exhibit 4). As Plaintiff states,
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD PAY
ROYALTY ON ALL COAL PRODUCED AND 8QLD BY IT FROM THE LEASED
PROPERTY INCLUDING THAT PRODUCED BEFORE SUBMITTING ITS REQUEST
FOR APPROVAL OF THE ASSIGNMENT.
Trail Mountain Coal Company is the party responsible to pay
the royalties due the State of Utah under the lease in question
because it was Trail Mountain that actually mined and sold the coal
during

the

entire audit period

(Exhibit

5) .

Also, as the

recognized operator of the mine, bonded, and accepted by the State,
Trail Mountain was the actual party holding the right to mine the
coal under the lease and was involved from the day the lease was
issued by the State through the time covered by the audit (Exhibits
2, 82, Stipulated Fact No. 9, R. 666, 668, 676). The State lease
was only a part of the Trail Mountain mining operation which
comprised an area composed of various leases obtained from private
land owners, the State of Utah, and the Federal Government.
(Stipulated Fact No's 12, 69, 75).
All the parties involved knew that Trail Mountain was in fact
the operator and real party in interest dealing with the State on
these matters.

If Trail Mountain was not the operator and real

party in interest, why would its representative visit the Division
offices as early as 1976, (Brief of Appellant at 9-10) three years
prior to the "attempted" oral sublease (Agreement of Sublease), and
five years prior to the assignment?

The answer simply is that

Trail Mountain was in fact the party which dealt with the State
regarding this lease from the date of issuance.
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Mountain (Exhibits 69, 95). Trail Mountain was obligated to file
reports with the State, which it did, and to pay the royalties
required by those reports, which it also did.
simply paid the royalty at the wrong rate.

Trail Mountain

Trail Mountain is the

only party which paid royalties to the State for State Coal Lease
ML 22603 (Exhibit 2) .

Trail Mountain began paying royalties in

July 1979 (Exhibit 2, 5). If Trail Mountain is not the responsible
party, why is it the only party to have paid royalties; royalties
which were paid prior to the assignment in 1981?
The court should keep in mind that it was the Plaintiff, Trail
Mountain, which commenced this lawsuit asking the court to enjoin
the State from collecting the unpaid royalties (R. 1) . It was the
Plaintiff that paid the royalties at the rate of 15 cents per ton
throughout the audit period and it was Plaintiff that mined and
sold the coal under the terms of the lease and received the benefit
therefrom (Exhibit 2, Stipulated Fact No's 13, 31). To hold that
Trail Mountain should not be held responsible for payment of
royalties for coal it has mined and sold under the coal lease in
question would be unjust and reward bad
concepts of fairness.

faith and disregard

If a party can extract minerals from State

school lands and deal on an on-going basis with the State over a
period of time and then claim no payment is due for the minerals
which it has mined and sold by taking the position that it did not
have a contract with the State, justice is not served.

If the

Plaintiff didn't have a valid lease with the state, then it
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"When to the constitutional provision last
quoted, we add the further provision that the
State of Utah guarantees the proceeds of these
lands against loss or diversion, thus making
itself an insurer and is honor bound to make
good any loss that the schools might sustain
by diverting these lands or permitting them to
be diverted to other purposes, the conclusion
becomes irresistible that the statutes of
limitation have no application to the land in
question." Id. at 676.
The Van Wagoner Court in quoting O'Brien v. Wilson, a Washington
Supreme Court opinion said:
" . . . this being the nature of the title to
the land granted for the special purposes
named, it is evident that to give such
efficacy to a statute of limitation of a state
as would operate to confer a permanent right
of possession to any portion thereof upon an
individual for his private use would be to
allow that to be done by indirection which
could not be done directly; and to permit
title to school lands in this state to be
acquired indirectly by adverse possession
would be repugnant to the laws of the United
States and the Constitution of the state." Id.
at 676.
The Van Wagoner case was reheard and the Utah Supreme Court
decision, in upholding its original decision, added to the original
opinion by saying:
" . . . this Court was compelled to determine
the question once for all as to whether or not
the statutes of limitation relied on by
appellants apply to the lands in dispute. We
came to the conclusion the statutes do not
apply for the reason for such application
would be repugnant to both the letter and the
spirit of the state Constitution, the
provisions of which we have quoted at length
in the opinion.
The Constitution declares
that such lands "shall be held in trust for
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Trail

Mountain

to

the

State of Utah constitute an open, current, and mutual account and
statutes of limitation do not start to run until final payment.
See Wortman v. Sun Oil Company, 236 Kansas 266, 690 P.2d 385 (Ks.
1984) .
Third, assuming arguendo that a limitation of actions were to
apply, it would be that found in § 78-12-2 which provides:
"The state will not sue any person for or in
respect to any real property, or the issue or
profits thereof, by reason of the right or
title of the state to the same, unless:
(1) such right or title shall have accrued
within seven years before any action or other
proceeding for the same shall be commenced; or
(2) the state or those from whom it claims
shall have received the rents and profits of
such real property, or some part thereof,
within seven years, (emphasis added).
While the plaintiff has contended that a six year statute of
limitations applies and has referred to Article II of Title 78
dealing with limitations of actions other than real properties and
particularly § 78-12-23(2)

(Brief of Appellant at 42), it has

ignored the actual provision which would apply which is § 78-12-2
dealing with the issues and profits from lands and applying that to
the State. If this Court were to find that a statute of limitation
does apply, it would be the one provided in § 78-12-2 which would
allow the State to recover all but the first two quarters of the
audit period, not the year and two quarters as contended by
Plaintiff.
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V.

THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IM" AWARDING PRE-JUDGMENT INTEREST.
BUT IT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING INTEREST AT THE RATE PROVIDED BY
THE RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE BOARD OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY.
A.
Pre-judgment
Royalties.
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Should
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that is, that these lands are school trust lands and that the
State, as trustee, has a duty to obtain full value for them, the
trial court should reconsider its prior conclusion of not awarding
interest.

Id. at 732.

The trial court, after trial, did award

pre-judgment interest at the statutory rate of 6%, the rate in
effect when the state coal lease was issued.
B.
To
On
In

The Board Of State Lands And Forestry Has Statutory Power
Adopt Rules And Regulations Setting Interest And Penalties
Delinquent Royalties Which Rules Should Have Been Applied
This Case.

The Board of State Lands and Forestry is authorized by statute
to adopt rules and regulations with regard to the management of the
school trust land and to accomplish the purposes of the trust.
Utah Code Ann. § 65-1-23.

The Board, in carrying out those

responsibilities has, over the years, adopted rules and regulations
dealing with the proper and timely payment of royalties on mineral
leases.
The Board established rules and regulations regarding interest
and late fee penalties.

Effective November 4, 1982, an interest

rate of 1.5% per month was charged on past due royalties (Exhibit
100).

Effective December 26, 1983, an interest rate of 1.5% per

month was charged on past due royalties, together with a 6% late
fee penalty (Exhibit 101). Effective July 1, 1986, an adjustable
interest rate, based on the rate charged by the Internal Revenue
Service plus 4%, was charged on past due royalties (Exhibit 102).
Numerous State agencies have rules that provide for late fee
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In the instant case, the trial court properly awarded prejudgment interest, but erred in its decision not to use the rate
set by the rules and regulations of the Board.

The court, in

refusing to apply the regulatory interest rate, concluded that to
do so would change the monetary obligations under the lease. This
conclusion is error.

Imposition of interest and late fees on

delinquent payments do not change the terms of the lease. A change
in the interest rate available in the event of breach does not
impair obligations under contracts entered
change.

into prior to the

Interest is merely an element of damages.

Jamaica Sav.

Bank v. Toomey. 77 Misc 2d 887, 355 NYS2d 268, affd 46 App. Div. 2d
847, 363 NYS2d 313 (N.Y. 1974).

Appellant by its own choice

elected not to pay the royalties on time.

In doing so, Appellant

understood

that

or

should

have

consequences of that breach.

understood

there

would

be

States may alter laws governing

remedies available under an existing contract so long as an
effective remedy is preserved.

Siebert v. Lewis, 122 U.S. 284, 30

L. Ed 1161, 7 S. Ct. 1190 (1887); Edwards v. Kearzev. 96 U.S. 595,
24 L. Ed 793 (1877); Re: Fidelity State Bank, 35 Idaho 797, 209 P
449 (Id. 1922) . A change or limitation of a remedy, which does not
materially abridge a right, does not impair an obligation of a
contract.

Kirkman v. Bird. 22 Utah 100, 61 P. 338 (Ut. 1900);

Salter v. Nelson. 85 Utah 460, 39 P.2d 1061 (Ut. 1935).
The lease is silent on the question of interest or even the
remedies available in the event of a failure by the lessee to pay
40
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in return for the use of trust property or loan of trust
funds.
Id, at 236.

The Court then stated that to allow below market

interest rate loans would result in the trust subsidizing the
farming and ranching operations, which was contrary to the Oklahoma
Constitution and Enabling Act.
The statutory rate of 6% during the audit period is below
market rates of interest.

If Plaintiff had paid the royalties on

time, as it covenanted and agreed to do, those funds would have
been deposited

in the School Trust Fund and earned the same

interest rates as did the other State trust funds.

Between 1978

and 1985, the State Treasurer's Investment Pool, which includes all
trust funds entrusted to the State, earned from 7% to 14.24% in
interest.

The prime rate of interest and the rate charged by the

Internal Revenue Service on delinquent tax payments during the time
over which the Court awarded 6% interest are listed in Addendum 6.
The trial court awarded pre-judgment interest, at the rate of
6% (Finding of Fact No. 21) . Had the trial court properly applied
the Board's rules and regulations, which were in place to help
accomplish for the State the duty to return full value to the
trust, the amount of $6,105,638.22 (SIX MILLION ONE HUNDRED FIVE
THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY-EIGHT DOLLARS AND TWENTY-TWO CENTS) (R.
1940) in pre-judgment interest would have been awarded.

As a

result of the trial court's ruling, the school trust fund has lost
approximately FOUR MILLION DOLLARS ($4,000,000). To not award that
42
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THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY REFUSED TO AWARD TO PLAINTIFF A
DEDUCTION FOR CLAIMED TRANSPORTATION EXPENSES.
A.
Plaintiff Did Not Prove Entitlement To Transportation
Costs*
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B. Plaintiff's Transportations Expenses Were Reimbursed By The
Buyers Of The Coal Extracted From The State Lease.
Trail Mountain had contracts for the sale of coal under which
it was allowed credits against the sales price of the coal for the
transportation of the coal to market (Exhibits 97, p. 8; 98, p. 7 ) ,
To allow the credit against the sales price upon which the royalty
is calculated and then in addition allow a separate deduction for
transportation
transportation.

would

constitute

Plaintiff

has

a

double

already

deduction

received

credit

for
for

transportation costs from the purchasers of the State's coal. The
court should not now make Utah's school children pay again for the
same costs.
C. Plaintiff Is Not Entitled To An Automatic Transportation
Deduction Under Either Federal Or State Law.
The State coal lease contains no mention of any type of
deduction for transportation or any other production or operational
expense (Exhibit 1).

There is also no Division of State Lands and

Forestry regulation or Utah Statute which allows transportation or
any other expense to be deducted from royalty payments for any
mineral or commodity in which the State holds an interest.

The

school trust is not in the business of subsidizing the coal
industry by sharing in the expenses related to mineral operations
on trust lands, and such was not the intention of the Enabling Act
which granted these lands to the State.
The lease calls for the payment of royalty based on the value
of the coal produced or sold.

The sales price is the fairest
44

indication of value and a percentage rate allows the royalty to
fluctuate with changing market conditions.

The market price

reflects the costs to produce and sell the coal including labor,
equipment, transportation, and royalties.

To allow Plaintiff to

deduct from the price of coal the cost of transporting it would, in
effect, incorporate a new term in the lease agreement entered into
by the parties.
Plaintiff has argued that if the State is allowed to adopt the
federal royalty rate it should also be required to adopt the
federal royalty scheme and definition of value for the basis of
calculating royalties. Defendants disagree. The State coal lease
form, by adopting the prevailing federal rate, does not adopt the
federal method of calculating royalties but merely refers to the
rate prevailing for federal lessees on leases issued at the time
the state royalty payment is due.
What is more informative than what the Brief of Appellant says
about

transportation

Plaintiff

claims that

deductions,

is

what

it

it should be allowed

does

not

say.

a transportation

deduction on royalties payable to the State because such is allowed
under the federal scheme.

Plaintiff does not claim however, that

it actually received or took such a deduction on its federal
leases.
Trail Mountain mined coal from federal leases in the same mine
and paid a royalty of 8% on that coal.

The federal coal and state

coal was mined concurrently and transported to the same point of
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sale (Stipulated Fact No.fs 69, 75). The federal royalty reporting
forms have a space for reporting transportation expenses (Exhibit
99) . Trail Mountain did not claim a deduction for transporting its
federal coal on the royalty reports it filed with the Federal
Government on coal from the same mine (Exhibit 99) .

However,

transportation costs may have been backed out or deducted from the
values used to calculated the federal royalty (R. 1976).

It is

therefore possible that transportation costs were also backed out
of the values used to determine the royalty owed to the State (R.
1942-44).
The Federal Government, in its mineral leasing programs, has
also dealt with the problem of determining deductions, including
those for transportation, in its royalty calculations.

However,

transportation

Minerals

deductions

are

not

allowed

by

the

Management Service (hereinafter "MMS") unless they are requested
and approved.

Coastal States Energy Company, MMS-86-0149-MIN.

Trail Mountain relies on references to "longstanding MMS policy"
(R. 2770-71) to justify its claim for transportation deductions.
The Notice of Proposed Rulemaking upon which Plaintiff relies was
published more than two years after the Trail Mountain audit. The
language Plaintiff relies on is found in a section entitled
"Proposed

§206.262, Transportation

Allowances" and

states

pertinent part:
...[T]he proposed regulation is a continuation of
longstanding MMS policy; however, there has never been
46

in

explicit guidance or regulation
transportation allowances.

pertaining

to coal

* * * *

The following explanation is not intended to be
conclusive or exhaustive but is intended to convey the
general criteria MMS would apply to determine whether a
transportation allowance is warranted, (emphasis added) .
Federal Register, Vol. 52, No. 10, 1840, 1846 (January 15, 1987).
Presumably the use of the word "would" here indicates that the
writer is not referring to criteria the MMS "does" use to determine
transportation allowances, but the criteria the MMS "would" use if
it elected to determine such allowance at some future time.

The

decision in the Coastal States, Supra, matter explains the MMS
policy in stating:
In accordance with these and subsequently
amended provisions [referring to 30 CFR §
211.63(b) and 30 CFR §203.200(g)], lessees may
apply for approval of deductions from arm'slength sales prices to reflect reasonable
transportation and qualified processing costs
incurred in connection with the sale. The
RVSD gives effect to the approved deductions
beginning with the first day of the month
following the date that the lessee's deduction
application
is
received
by
the RVSD.
(emphasis added). MMS-86-0149-MIN.
This

case

clearly

demonstrates

that

the

allowance

of

a

transportation deduction was not automatic or "mandate[d]" (Brief
of Appellant at 39) as Plaintiff claims.

A federal lessee would

have to apply for the transportation deduction and receive approval
prior to taking the deduction in its calculation of royalties.
Coastal States, Supra.

Trail Mountain did not do so.
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CONCLUSION
The law has consistently held that transactions involving
trust lands must result in the trust receiving full return on its
assets.

This Court should affirm the trial court's ruling that

Plaintiff should pay royalties at the rate of 8% of value of the
coal produced from the leased properties. This Court should order
that the Judgment be amended to require Plaintiff to pay interest
on the delinquent royalties at the annual rate of 18% from December
31, 1983 to July 1, 1986 plus 6% penalty and interest at the rate
prescribed by Division of State Lands Rules and Regulations for the
period involved.
Respectfully submitted this Z7

day of May, 1993.
McKEACHNIE & ALLRED
Attorneys for Defendants

By:Jib^^^
Gay]Sfe F. McKeachnie

BV: rAur^a//^l,
Clark B. A l l r e d
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Plaintiff,
v.
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE DIVISION
OF STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY,
THE UTAH BOARD OF STATE LANDS
AND FORESTRY, THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES,
DEE HANSEN, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
OF THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES,

Civil No. 4847

Defendants.
Trial

of this matter

came on

regularly before the

Court on March 17, 1992, and the Court received testimony and
exhibits for and on behalf of each of the parties, and took
this matter

under advisement, and

rules as here and

after

stated.
This case has been before the Utah Supreme Court and
many of the issues originally presented by the parties were
disposed of by the decision of that Court, and the Supreme
Court further gave direction to the trial court as to how the
balance

of the issues should be considered

and

determined.

Under

the

coal

lease

entered

into

between

the

Plaintiff and the State of Utah, the Plaintiff was required and
covenanted and agreed to pay royalty on the coal mined at the
alternative rates as specified in Article III, Paragraph II (a)
or (b), whichever was higher.
During the audit period, the Plaintiff paid royalty
under Paragraph (a), and it is the contention of the Defendants
that

the

Plaintiff

should

have

paid

the

royalty

rate

as

specified under Paragraph (b), since that rate was higher.
This Court has previously found by way of a partial
summary judgment that Paragraph (b), on its face, is ambiguous
and

subject

to

varying

interpretations.

However,

as

the

Supreme Court noted, this fact does not prevent the provisions
enforcement, and that extrinsic evidence should be considered
to resolve the ambiguity to carry out the true intent of the
parties.
The Supreme Court stated, "The language of the lease
provision is clear.
higher

of

conclusion

the
has

two

The intent of the parties was that the
rates

been

should

further

be paid

the

established

by

State".
the

This

evidence

presented to the effect that the intent of the drafters of the
lease was to fix the royalty payment equal to, or the same as,
that being paid to the federal government on coal leases on
federal land.
(2)

When the lease at issue in this case was signed and
executed

February

8,

1965,

the

rate

set

by

the

federal

government on its coal leases was fifteen cents (150) a ton,
which is the same amount provided as specified in Paragraph (a)
of the State lease•
In August of 1976, the federal government changed the
amount to be paid on its coal leases to eight percent (8%) of
the value of the coal produced, which would, if the intent of
the

drafters

of

the

State

lease

is

to

be

carried

out,

automatically require that the lessees under State leases pay
the

royalty

percent

as provided

(8%)

of

the

in Paragraph
value

of

(b) , since the eight

the

production

would

be

considerably higher than fifteen cents (150) a ton.
Since the Plaintiff had the legal obligation of paying
that

higher

provisions

rate
of

interpretations,
paragraph's

commencing

that
the

meaning

at

paragraph
Court
in

may

must

view

that
be

make
of

time

all

and

subject
a

finding
of

the

since

the

to

varying

as

to the

facts

and

circumstances existing at the time that the Plaintiff had the
obligation of paying the greater amount.
A

reasonable

inquiry

by

the

Plaintiff

would

have

established the fact, and this Court finds, that the prevailing
federal rate during the period of the audit was eight percent

(3)

(8%) of the value of production.
rate

set

by

the

federal

This was the one and only

government

for underground

mining

royalty, and the facts would further show, and the Court finds,
that all leases issued or readjusted during the audit period by
the federal government, some one hundred seventy seven in the
state of Utah, all but four or five, set the rate at the eight
percent (8%) figure.
In view of these facts, there can be no dispute or
ambiguity as to the prevailing rate that was being paid to the
federal government on its leases.
Since

this

rate was

being

charged

by

the

federal

government on all its coal land in the state of Utah, except
for a very few isolated exceptions that were made because of
specific application, the different interpretations that could
be placed
problem.

upon

"land

of similar character" ceases to be a

The same federal rate was being charged whether the

land was within the same mine, the same canyon, or the same
area.

That

provision

under

these

circumstances,

had

no

particular significance.
Since the rate fixed by the federal government was
almost universally applied during the audit, the question of
whether it applied to lessees of land issued prior to or at the
time of the beginning of the quarter when the payment was to be
made is likewise not important since the same rate applies to
both situations.
(4)

The Court finds that there could be no ambiguity in
the application of Paragraph (b) , and that the Plaintiff, if
they had made reasonable inquiry and obtained the facts that
were readily available, could have determined with certainty
the amount of royalty that they should have been paying under
the alternative royalty provision.
The Utah Supreme Court in its decision stated, "The
Plaintiffs

were

responsible

for calculating

the

alternative

federal prevailing royalty payments from the royalty reporting
forms that they had submitted to the State".
stated

in

another

portion

of

the

The Court further

opinion,

"In

sum,

the

Plaintiffs had the duty to determine whether the prevailing
federal rate was higher and if so, to pay at that rate.

The

alternative royalty provision did not require any affirmitive
action by the State".
In

view

of

that

responsibility

imposed

upon

the

Plaintiff, the Court finds that the Plaintiffs had no right to
rely on any representations made by employees of the State
Division of Lands and Forestry as to what the rate should be,
or those employees interpretation as to what was meant by the
wording

in

Paragraph

(b) of

the

royalty

clause.

This

is

particularly true when considered with the fact that the leased

(5)

1 f;?a

ground

was school

trust lands.

In another portion of the

Supreme Courts opinion, the Court stated, "The Plaintiffs knew,
or should have known, that the leased lands were trust lands
and that they also knew that the lease required them to pay the
prevailing federal rate when it was the higher rate".
Reasonable prudence and diligence would

require the

Plaintiff to do more than make inquiry of employees of the
Defendants who, in fact, would have no authority to alter or
change the terms of the lease as to what royalties should be
paid or as to the meaning of any terms.

The facts show that

this was the only action taken by Plaintiff.
The Plaintiff has further contended that the auditors
used the wrong figures in calculating the delinquent royalty
when they failed to give a credit for the cost of haulage.
The State auditors relied upon production and sales revenues
submitted to them by Bruce Anderson, the Plaintiff's accounting
manager, and as the Supreme Court stated, "The State had a
right to rely on the good faith of its lessees in calculating
the royalty and submitting the required information".
If a haulage allowance were to be made, application
should

have

been

made

at

the

time

that

the

figures

information were given to the State by the Plaintiff.

(6)

and

The

Court

can

find

nothing

in

the

evidence

that

establishes that the State, through actions of anyone who had
the authority

to do so, intentionally

waived

the

right to

require payment of the greater amount as specified in the lease•
The Court finds that the Board of State Lands and
Forestry was the only one who could make binding obligations on
the State of Utah relative to the lease, and that they made no
indication that they were waiving the right to the highest of
the rates contained in the royalty provision.

The Court has

concluded that the State did not waive its right to collect the
eight percent (8%) value of production royalty.
This Court cannot find evidence that shows that an
injustice is being done by requiring the Plaintiffs to pay the
eight percent (8%) royalty that would invoke the exception to
the legal principle that generally estoppel may not be asserted
against the State of Utah.

There is no injustice in requiring

the Plaintiff to do what they were required to do under the
lease, and particularly is this true because of the State's
obligation in administering trust lands.
The Court further finds that the prevailing case-law
in the state of Utah holds that the Statute of Limitations has
no application as to school trust lands, and therefore denies
the Plaintiff's defense that the audit period exceeds the
period of six years imposed for collecting on written contracts.

(7)

The

Court

has

concluded

that

the

amount

of

royalty

that should have been reported and paid by the Plaintiff each
quarter was capable of a definitive determination, and when the
Plaintiff

failed to pay this amount when due, that the State

was entitled to collect interest on all delinquent amounts.
The lease itself is silent relative to the payment of
interest

or

penalties

on

the

delinquent

royalty

payments.

Under these circumstances, the Court is of the opinion that the
State is entitled to that rate of interest authorized by law on
delinquent

accounts

which

would

be

six

percent

(6%)

on

the

delinquent payments, which was the legal rate in effect at the
time the lease was executed.
The Court has further concluded that the Board had no
right

by

regulation

to

undertaken by the lessee.

change

the

monetary

obligation

If such authority were allowed, the

State Board could set any arbitrary rate that it saw fit, and
completely rewrite the monetary obligations under the lease in
the process.
By making the Plaintiff legally obligated to pay the
legal rate of interest on the delinquent payments, the State is
receiving

the

maximum

legal

return

trustee of the school lands.

(8)

under

its

obligation

as

The

Court

by

way

of

partial

summary

judgment

previously concluded that the document entitled "Sub-Lease"
by which

the Plaintiff obtained

State

lease, was

filed

a

motion

in

fact

an

requesting

the right to mine under the

assignment.

that

the

The

Court

Plaintiff

reconsider

has
that

ruling, and has submitted their Memorandum of Legal Points and
Authorities.
The
taken

into

Court

grants

account

the Motion

those

to

additional

Reconsider,

matters

and

has

contained

in

Plaintiff's Memorandum.
However, the Court is still of the opinion that the
document,

even

though

entitled

Sub-Lease,

is

in

fact

an

assignment, since the Plaintiff received all rights under the
lease and agreed to perform and assume all duties.
THEREFORE, the Court's prior decision relative to the
matter

contained

in

the

Partial

Summary

Judgment

mentioned

above shall remain in force and effect, and the Court is, on
this date, signing a formal order to that effect.
THEREFORE,
tonnage

figures

and

the

Court

sales

has

prices

concluded

based

as

by

found

the

upon

the

State's

auditors, that the Plaintiff owes to the Defendants the sum of
$3,631,615.53

in

delinquent

royalty

payments,

together

with

interest at the rate of 6% per annum on all delinquent payments

from the date that they became due.

(9)

The Court grants judgment

in favor of the Defendants and against the Plaintiff for this
amount together with interest as stated, and directs that the
Defendant prepare Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and a
Decree in accordance with this decision.
The Court further directs that the Defendants prepare
and

submit with

its proposed

Findings of Fact, an itemized

statement of the interest calculations based upon six percent
(6%)

per

annum,

and

if

the

Plaintiff

objects

to

those

calculations, the Court will set hearing to make a definite
determination relative to the amount of interest.
DATED this

<?yfi "3av of March, 1992.

(10)
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FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Judge Boyd Bunnell
Civil No. 4847

The above captioned matter came before the Court for trial on
March

17,18 and

19 1992.

Plaintiff was represented

by its

accorded in Judgment Record

attorneys, L.R. Curtis, Jr., and Richie D. Haddock.

Defendants

were represented by their attorneys, Gayle F. McKeachnie and Clark
B. Allred.

The parties prepared and submitted to the Court an

Amended Pre-Trial Order, which set forth undisputed facts.

The

Court received testimony and exhibits offered by each of the
parties, and after hearing argument from counsel, took the matter
under advisement. This case has also been before the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah which decided

certain

issues and gave

direction to the trial court as to how the remaining issues should
be considered

and determined. The Court having fully considered

the matter, entered its Memorandum Decision, hereby enters the
following Findings of Fact:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The Utah State Land Board on behalf of the State of Utah

and the Plaintiff are parties to a Utah State Coal Lease being
Mineral Lease #22603.
2.

Pursuant to the terms of that lease, Plaintiff was

required and covenanted and agreed to pay royalty on the coal mined
at the alternative rates as specified in Article III, Second, (a)
or (b) of the lease, which states as follows:
The Lessee, in consideration of the granting
of the rights and privileges aforesaid, hereby
covenants and agrees as follows:
•

•

*

2
9 -; 'j . ^
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SECOND: To pay to Lessor quarterly, on or
before the 15th day of the month succeeding
each quarter, royalty
(a) at the rate of 15 cents per ton of 2000
lbs. of coal produced from the leased premises
and sold or otherwise disposed of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning
of the quarter for which payment is being
made, for federal lessees of land of similar
character under coal leases issued by the
United States at that time,
whichever is higher . . . .
3.

The real property which was subject to the State Coal

Lease was granted to the State of Utah, under the Utah Enabling Act
for the support of the common schools.
4.

During the time period 1979 through 1985, the Plaintiff

mined coal from the property and paid the State of Utah royalty at
15 cents per ton under provision (a) of the royalty clause in the
State Coal Lease.
5.

In 1985 the State of Utah audited the performance of

Plaintiff under the lease including the royalty payments by the
Plaintiff.

Following

the

audit

the

State

claimed

that

the

Plaintiff should have paid a royalty rate of 8% as specified under
part (b) of the royalty provision since that was the higher rate.
6. The Court had previously found that part (b) was ambiguous
and subject to various interpretations.

As noted by the Utah

Supreme Court, that does not prevent enforcement of the royalty
3
<)-.,

..

Recorded in Judgment Record

provision but rather requires the Court to receive extrinsic
evidence to resolve the ambiguity and carry out the true intent of
the parties.
7.

The Utah Supreme Court had previously stated that,
The language of the lease provision is clear.
The intent of the parties was that the higher
of the two rates should be paid the state.

8.

That conclusion by the Utah Supreme Court was further

established by the evidence received at trial to the effect that
the intent of the drafters of the lease was to fix a royalty
payment equal to, or the same as, that being paid to the federal
government on coal leases on federal land.
9.

When the lease at issue in this case, was signed and

executed on February 8, 1965, the standard royalty rate set by the
federal government on its coal leases was fifteen cents (.15) per
ton, the same amount set forth in part (a) of the State Coal Lease
royalty provision.
10.

In August of 1976, the federal law changed.

The Federal

Coal Leasing Amendments Act was passed and regulations promulgated
thereunder. At that time the federal government changed the amount
to be paid on its coal leases to eight percent (8%) of the value of
the coal produced.

Leases issued after this date contained this

royalty except for a few exceptions, specifically authorized upon
application.
4

2?;^>
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11.

To carry out the intent of the drafters of the State Coal

Lease, the lessees under the State Coal Leases after the change in
the Federal law would automatically be required to pay the royalty
provided in provision (b) , that being eight percent (8%) of the
value of the coal production since that is higher than the fifteen
cents per ton required under provision (a).
12.

The

Plaintiff,

by

reasonable

inquiry,

could

have

established the fact that the prevailing federal rate during the
period of the audit was eight percent (8%) of the value of the coal
produced.
13.

Eight percent (8%) was the one and only royalty rate set

by the federal government for underground mining during the time
period in question with few exceptions.
14.

The prevailing federal rate during the audit period was

eight percent of the value of the coal produced by the Plaintiff
from the State Coal Lease and was the rate that should have been
paid by the Plaintiff.
15.

All leases issued or readjusted by the federal government

during the audit period, in the State of Utah, except four or five,
set the royalty rate at eight percent (8%) of value.
16.

The same federal royalty rate was being charged by the

federal government during the audit period for coal leases in Utah
on all land whether it was within the same mine, the same canyon,
5
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or the same area.
17,

The only action taken by the Plaintiff to determine the

correct royalty rate was to make inquiry of the employees of the
Division of State Lands, who had no authority to alter or change
the terms of the leases or establish what royalty should be paid or
as to the meaning of any terms in the lease.
18.
allowance.

Plaintiff claimed that it was entitled to a haulage
However, Plaintiff never made application for such an

allowance and never provided to the state information regarding
such a claim.

The State auditors relied upon the production and

sales revenue information furnished by the Plaintiff.
19.

The amount of royalty owed for each quarter is capable

of mathematical determination.

The lease is silent as it relates

to the payment of interest and penalties.
20.

Based on the tonnage figures and sales prices set forth

on Schedule V to the Pre-Trial Order, the Plaintiff owes to the
Defendant the sum of $3,631,615.53 in delinquent royalty payments
together with interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum on each
delinquent payment from the date each payment became due.
21.

Defendants have submitted with these Findings the

interest calculation at the rate determined by the Court which
interest is $2,070,955.93 through April 1, 1992.

6
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
The Court having made the preceding Findings of Fact hereby
enters the following Conclusions of Law.
1.

Plaintiff had the legal obligation to determine and pay

the correct royalty rate owed on coal produced under the State Coal
Lease.
2.

The prevailing federal rate and therefor the rate the

Plaintiff should have paid under part (b) of the royalty provision
during the audit period was eight percent of the value of the coal
produced.
3.

Based on the fact that the rate fixed by the federal

government was almost universally applied during the audit the
questions regarding the terms "land of similar character" and
whether the provision applied to lessees of leases issued prior to
or

at

the

beginning

of

the quarter

are not

significant

in

determining the prevailing federal rate.
4.

The different interpretations placed on "land of similar

character" portion of the royalty clause under these facts had no
particular significance during the audit period.
5.

The Plaintiff had the duty to determine the prevailing

federal rate. There is no ambiguity in the application of part (b)
of the royalty provision and Plaintiff, by making reasonable
inquiry, could have determined the amount of royalty it should have
7
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paid under the alternative royalty provision,
6.

The Plaintiff, under the terms of the lease, had the

legal obligation to pay the higher rate commencing at the time the
federal rate was increased to 8% .
7.

Plaintiff had no right to rely on any representations

made by employees of the State Division of Lands and Forestry as to
what the rate should be or those employees interpretation as to
what was meant by the wording in part (b) of the royalty clause.
This is particularly true when considered with the fact that the
leased land was school trust lands.
8.

The Utah Supreme Court stated that "The Plaintiffs knew,

or should have known, that the leased lands were trust lands and
that they also knew that the lease required them to pay the
prevailing federal rate when it was the higher rate."
9.

Plaintiff in the exercise of reasonable prudence and

diligence was required to do more than make inquiry of State
employees who had no authority to alter or change the terms of the
lease as to what royalties should be paid or as to the meaning of
the terms of the lease.
10.

Plaintiff is not entitled to a haulage allowance.

11.

There was no evidence that the State, through the actions

of anyone who had authority to do so, intentionally waived the
right to require payment of the correct amount of royalty owed
8
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under the lease.
12.

The Board of State Lands and Forestry is the only one

that can make binding obligations on the State of Utah relative to
the

lease.

There was no evidence that the Board made any

indication that it was waiving the right to collect the highest
rate provided for in the royalty provision.
13.

The State did not waive its right to collect royalties

at the eight percent of the value of production.
14.

There is no evidence that an injustice is being done by

requiring the Plaintiff to pay the correct amount of royalty that
would invoke the exception to the legal principle that estoppel may
not be asserted against the State of Utah.

There is no injustice

in requiring the Plaintiff to do what it was required to do under
the lease and particularly is this true because of the State's
obligation in administering trust lands.
15.

The prevailing case law holds that the Statute of

Limitations has no application as to school trust lands.
16.

The amount of royalty that should have been reported and

paid by the Plaintiff each quarter
determination.

is capable of definitive

The State is entitled to collect interest on all

delinquent amounts.
17.

The Court is of the opinion that the state is entitled to

the rate of interest authorized by law, which is six percent (6%)
9
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the legal rate in effect at the time the lease was executed.
18.

The Board of the State Lands and Forestry had no right by

regulation to change the monetary obligation undertaken by the
lease.

If such authority were allowed, the Board could set any

arbitrary rate that it saw fit and rewrite the monetary obligation
under the lease.
19.

Plaintiff is obligated to pay the legal rate of interest

on delinquent payments and the State by receiving that interest
fulfills it obligation as trustee of school lands.
20.

The Court has previously determined that the "Sub-lease"

by which the Plaintiff obtained the right to mine under the state
lease was an assignment.

Plaintiff has filed a motion asking the

Court to reconsider that ruling.

The Court grants that motion and

after taking into account the additional matters set forth in the
Plaintiff's memorandum, is still of the opinion that the document,
though entitled "Sub-lease", was in fact, an assignment since the
Plaintiff received all rights under the lease and agreed to the
performance of all duties.
21.

The Court's prior decision on that issue, therefore,

remains in full force and effect and the Court has signed a formal
order to that effect.
22.

Based on the tonnage figures and sales prices set forth

on Schedule V to the Pre-Trial Order, the Court finds that the
10
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Plaintiff owes to the Defendant the sum of $3,631,615.53

in

delinquent royalty payments together with interest thereon at the
rate of 6% per annum on each delinquent payment from the date each
payment became due.
DATED this

/ r

„
)7$
ay of May, 1992

BY THE COURT:

Y4frff/4
Boyd Bunnell^ Distrjkrlf/&udge

t:\marnie\trailffltn\finding.con
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DEC 11992
HOLME ROBERTS & OWEN
William B. Prince, 2653
L. R. Curtis, Jr., 0784
Brian T. Hansen, 5110
111 East Broadway, Suite 1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 521-5800

-~=L—ucp.

JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOK & MCDONOUGH
Calvin L. Rampton, 2682
1500 First Interstate Plaza
170 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 521-3200
Attorneys for Trail Mountain Coal Company
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF EMERY COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
FINAL ORDER
AND JUDGMENT

vs.
THE UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY, RALPH
MILES, DIRECTOR OF THE
DIVISION OF STATE LANDS AND
FORESTRY, THE UTAH BOARD OF
STATE LANDS AND FORESTRY,
THE UTAH DEPARTMENT OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, DEE HANSEN,
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
UTAH DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES,

Civil No. 4847
Judge Boyd Bunnell

Defendants.

By Order executed on September 10, 1992, the Court
ordered that, to avoid any confusion with respect to the
finality date for purposes of appeal, a final order and
o 1002
' !-~5udgment would be entered herein only after the record hai
!cp_rc?ed in Judgment Docket
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been supplemented to include Trail Mountain Coal Company's
transportation costs and an order incorporating the Court's
transportation cost finding had been entered.

The Court,

having entered its Order concerning transportation costs on
October 21, 1992, by this Final Order and Judgment:
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES AS FOLLOWS:
1.

Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with

prejudice.
2.

Defendants are awarded Three Million Six Hundred

Thirty-one Thousand Six Hundred Fifteen Dollars and 53/100
cents ($3,631,615.53) for unpaid royalties and interest in the
amount of Two Million Seventy Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty-five
Dollars and 93/100 cents ($2,070,955.93) for a total judgment
of Five Million Seven Hundred Two Thousand Five Hundred
Seventy-one Dollars and 46/100 cents ($5,702,571.46).
DATED this JS"^

day of November, 1992.
BY THE COURT:

Gayle Qf. McKeachnie
Attorneys for Defendants
McKeachnie & Allred
BTHP:AH6
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed in the U.S. mail,
postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT this $3^

day of November, 1992, to

the following:
R. Paul Van Dam
Utah S t a t e A t t o r n e y General
Stephen G. Boyden
A s s i s t a n t A t t o r n e y General
124 S t a t e C a p i t o l
S a l t Lake C i t y , Utah 84114
Gayle F. McKeachnie
Clark B. A l l r e d
McKeachnie & A l l r e d
363 E a s t Main S t r e e t
V e r n a l , Utah 84 078

<£dUb*d -&x£x>^
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Utah State Lease for

COAL
THIS INDENTURE OF LEASE AND AOREEMENT entered into in duplicate this B*fr
day of
^bllKry
by and between the STATE LAND BOARD, acting in behalf of the State of Utah, hereinafter called die Leasor, and

^

J065^

MALCOLM N. McJCIKMOM
1222 South Hain Street
Salt U k t City. Utah 84101

party of the second part, hereinafter called the Leasee, under and Pursuant to Title 65, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
WITNESSETH: That the Leasor, in consideration of the rents and royalrjee to be paid and the covenants to be observed by the Lessee, as hereinaftar sat forth, does hereby gram and lease to the Leasee the exclusive right and privilege to mine, remove, and dupose of all of the
said minerals aw upon, or under the following described tract of land situated in

All of Section Thirty-eix ( 3 o ) , Tovmihi
Si* (C) EAjt, Salt Lake Meridian,

EcCTy

County, State of Utah, co-wit

Seventeen (17) Sou:li, Rcnge

contatninf a total of
***y * W
acres, more or lees, together with the right to use and occupy so much of the surface o( said land as
may be required for all purposes reasonably incident to the mining, removal, and disposal of said minerals, according to the provisions of this
lease, for the penod ending sen jmm after the. first day of January next mcrsoriing the darn hereof and as long thereafter u said minerals may
be produced in cnsnnwrial eajantfcjat from aaie] lands, or Leasee shall continue to make the payments required by Article III hereof, upon
condinon thai at the and of aadi twenty (JO) ftat penod succeeding the first day of the year tn which this lease, is issued, such readjustment
of terms and conditions may W «UMH as she lass or may determine to be neceaaary in the interest of rhe State
ARTJCLBf
This Lease • gieamd naUeet hi all respects to and under the conditions of the Laws of the State of Utah and existing rules and regulations
and such operating nates and regulaHons at may be hereafter approved and adopted by the State Land Board.
ARTICLE fl
True lease covers only rhe mining, removal, and disposal of the minerals specified in true lease, but the Lessee shall promptly notify the
thy 11senr of aha discovery of any minerals excepting those enumerated herein.

ArncLEm
Th» Lanaa> In consideration at* the granting of tha rights and privileges aforaaaid, hereby covenants and agrees as follows:
FIRSTi To pay to die Lessor as rental for the land covered by this lease the sum of fifty (50) cents per acre per annum. All such annual
payments of rental shall be made in advance on the 2nd day of January of each year, except the

12&5

rental which is payable

on the execution of this lease All rentals aha 11 be credited against royalties for the year in which they accrue
SECOND* To pay to Lessor quarterly,- on or before the 15th day of oSe month wrreeding each quarter, royalty
(a) at the rate of 15/ per tew of 2000 lbs. of coal produced from the leased premamea and sold or otherwise disposed of, or
(b) at tha rata arerailing, at the beginning of the quarter for which payment is being made, for federal leasees) of land of similar chari
acaet under coal leasee anued by tha United States at that
time,
—
__
whichever « higher, and, commencing with the year beginning tha January 1 following two yean from tha data hereof, to pay annual royalty
of at least $1.00 multiplied by the number of acres hereby leased regard lees of actual production, provided mat Lessor may, at any time after
the tenth anniversary data hereof, increase tha minimum annual royalty by not so exceed 50%.'

If the cad produced (roam the keeed prermfcts a) washed before atle or other dfcpeeetion be Leeea*, Lessee may pt? iwraf*? • » w* « M w i
product only, provided U r n tMlotainj accurate record by which the weight of weened co*J orspneting from the Ueeed pretties C M ba
ascertained and coampike with ell resjulariona end directives ueued by Leeaor to prevent wast* and to insure that royalty • pead ea a l weaned
coaJ orientating froai she Ueeed arsmisaa,
THIRD: To prepare end forward to the State l e n d Office, on or before die 15th day of the month next succeeding die quarter as which
the materia] ta produced, e certifled statement oi die amount of production of all of the keeed sucettneae disposed of froai end landa, tod
such other additional informerion ea the State Lend Board may from tune to rime require.
FOURTH: To keep at die mine office deer, accurate and detailed mapa on tracing doth, en a acale not more then 30 feet to die tack*
oi die workings in each aection of the leased landa and on die landa adjacent, aatd mapa to be coordinated with reference to a public land carrier ao that they can ba readily and correctly superimposed, and to fin rath to the Lessor annually, or upon demand, certified cop** of audi
mapa and auch written etatementa of operations aa may ba called for. All surveys ahall be made by a licensed engineer and aQ mapa certified
to by rum.
FIFTH• Not to fence or otherwise make tnacceaaibe to arock any watering place on die premaiee without first obtaining die written content
of Leaaor, nor to permit or contribute to die pollution of any aurface or subsurface water available or capable of being made available for domestic
or irrigation use,
SIXTH. Not to aaeign thia leaae or any interest therein, nor sublet any portion of die leaaed premise*, or any of die nghts and pmnleges
herein granted, without the written content of the Leaaor being first had and obtained

ARTICLE IV
The Leaaor hereby excepts and reaervea from the operation of tha leaae:
FIRST The right to permit for joint or several use auch easement! or rights-of-way upon, through, or in the land hereby leaaed aa may
be necessary or appropriate to die working of theae or other landa belonging to or administered by die Lessor containing mineral deposta
or for other use
SECOND The right to use, lease, sell, or otherwise dupoae oi die surface oi said landa or any part thereof, under existing State laws
or laws hereafter enacted, insofar as said surface ta not necessary for the Lesee in the mining, removal, or disposal of the leaaed substances therein, and to lease mineral deposits, other than those leaaed hereby, which may be contained in said landa ao long aa the recovery of such ds»
poaita does not unreasonably interfere with Leasee's rights herein granted.

ARTICLE V
Upon failure or refusal of the Lessee to accept the readjustment of terms and conditions demanded by die Lessor at rhe end of any twenty*
year period, such failure or refusal shall work a forfeiture of die lease and the same shall be canceled.

ARTICLE

VI

In caae of expiration, forfeiture, surrender or other rermmanon of this leaae, all underground timbering supports, shaft linings, rails and
other installanons necessary for the support of underground workings of any mines, and all rails or head frames and all instailanons which
cannot be removed without permanent injury to the premises and all construction and equipment installed underground to provide ventilation
for any mines, upon or in the said lands shall be and remain a part of the realty and shall revert to the Lessor without further consideration or
compentanon and shall be left by rhe Lessee in the lands.
All personal property of Lessee located within or upon the said lands, and all buildings, machinery, equipment and tools (other than the
installations to become the property of Lessor as above provided), shall be and remain the property of Lessee and Lessee shall be enntied to,
and may, within six (6) months after such expiranon, forfeiture, surrender or other termmanon of said lease, or within such extension of
rime aa may be granted by Leaaor, remove from die said landa such personal property and improvements, other than those items which sre
to remain rhe property of the Lector at above provided.
Leasee shall, upon terralTietJon, of_rhsj keac or abandonment of the leaaed premise for any reason, seal to Lessor's satisfaction all or such
part of xht mine openings on die premises at Leaaor shall request be sealed.

ARTICLE VII
It shall be the responsibility of the Leaeee to dope die sides of all operations of a surface nature to an angle of not less than 4S* or to
erect a barrier around auch operation at die State Land Board may require. Such sloping or fencing shall become a normal part of rhe operas o n of die leas* so aa to keep pace widi such operation to the extent that such operation ahall not coneutute a hazard

ARTICLE v m
Leani shall not sell or otherwise dispose oi any water rights acquired for use upon die leased premises except with Lessor's written peraaaatatn. Upon atrminatioo oi thia leaae for any reason, aQ such rights acquired by application to die Utah State Engineer ahall revert » the
Leaaor aa an appurtenance to the leaaed premises, and aQ such righo acquired by other means shall be offered to Leaaor in writing for puidiees
at Leasee's acq nasi t ion coats, provided that Leaaor shall be deemed to have rejected such offer if k does not accept the tame widun thirty
earyt after feceeet ineieof.

ARTrCLEBC
AQ of rhe terms, covenants, condinona, and obligations m this lease contained, shall be bmding upon the heirs, executors, sdmamstratora,
end assigns ef the l i s t s i ,

ARTICLE*
lias11 may terminate uSas leaae at any time upon giving ehree (J) months' notice in writing to die Leeaor and upon payment of aQ
rents and royalties] and other tame due end parable m die Leaaor, and upon complying with die terms of due leeee with respect to die preservation ef me working* in such order and condition at to permit of die continued operation oi the leaeed premiaea.

ARTICLE

n

Lessor, its officers and agents, shall have die right at aQ rimes to go in and upon die leaaed lands and premiaea, during die term of said
leaae to inspect die work done and rhe progress thereof on ttad lands and die products obtained nSerefrom, and to post any notices on die
said lend diet it may deem fit and proper; and alao shall permit any authorised representatives oi die Leaaor to eaaamine ail books and records
pertaining to operaaons under due leaae, and to make copies of and extracts from die same, sf desired.
ARTICLE XH
That kese is issued only under such ntle as die State of Utah may now hold* and that in die event die State is hereafter divested oi such
tkW, the Lessor shall not be liable for any damages sustained by die Leasee, not shall die Leasee be entited to or claim any refund ot rcntaJt
or loyalties or other monies dieietofcie paid to the Lessor.
ARTICLE Xu7
17 the Leaeee shall initiate or establish sny water right on the leaaed premises, such right, shall become aa appurtenance ot the leased~SM—iata- anal, apon the termination of the lease, the Lessee shall convey the right to the Lessor.

STATE OF UTAH
STATE LAND BOASD

*~/t^yj^iA.

STATE OF UTAH

LESSEE'S INDIVIDUAL AOCNOWLEDGEMENT

}-

COUNTY OF
On the

personally appeared before me

19_

day of

executed the

the signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledged to OM that
Given under my hand and teal this

day of

19-

My commission Expires:

"Notary Public, residing at:

STATE OF UTAH

LESSEE'S CORPORATE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

COUNTY OF
personally appeared before me

day of

On the

who being duly sworn did say that he is an officer of .

and that said instrument waa

MI behalf of said corporation by resolution of its Board of Directors, and aerd

admowl

edged to me that aaid ceenararJon executed the same.

Orven under my hand and seal this .

19-

day of

Expiree*

Ul

Notary t\Mic, residing at:

STATI Of UTAH
COUNTY OT SALT LUC1

}•

f On the f&L—
day of ^JJ/AU.L
» 19&U., prrwinaOy appeared before me Max C Gardner, who being by me dnry SWOTL
aUsf m\ that he » the Director of the State Land Board of the State of Utah and that said instrument was signed in behalf of aud Board by
a/ the Board. **d said Max C Gardner acknowledged to me that saad Board executed the tame ui behalf of the Stale of Utah.

ondor say hand and seal dm — j l Z -

•

&

*

-

«

^

'

day of

^f/tfUsJ*

*6S~
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UTAH ENABLING ACT
Utah Enabling Act, §6:
That upon the admission of said State into the Union,
sections numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two, and thirtysix in every township of said proposed state, and where
such sections, or any parts thereof have been sold or
otherwise disposed of by or under the authority of any
Act of Congress, other lands equivalent thereto, in legal
subdivisions of not less than one quarter section and as
contiguous as may be to the section in lieu of which the
same is taken, are hereby granted to said State for the
support of common schools....
Utah Enabling Act §10:
That the proceeds of lands herein granted for educational
purposes, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, shall
constitute a permanent school fund, the interest of which
only shall be expended for the support of said schools,
and such land shall not be subject to pre-emption,
homestead entry, or any other entry under the land laws
of the United States, whether surveyed or unsurveyed, but
shall be surveyed for school purposes only.
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
Utah Constitution, Article X, §5:
The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by an Act of
Congress, approved February 21st, 1855, for the
establishment of the University of Utah, and of all the
lands granted by an Act of Congress, approved July 16th,
1894, shall constitute permanent funds, to be safely
invested and held by the State; and the income thereof
shall be used exclusively for the support and maintenance
of the different institutions and colleges, respectively,
in accordance with the requirements and conditions of
said Acts of Congress.
(Article X was amended, effectively July 1, 1987, with Section 5
becoming Sections 5 and 7).
Utah Constitution, Article X, §5:
(1) There is established a permanent State School Fund
which shall consist of revenue from the following
sources: (a) proceeds from sales of all lands granted by
the United States to this state for the support of the
public elementary and secondary schools; (b) 5% of the
net proceeds from the sales of United States public lands
lying within this state; (c) all revenues derived from
non-renewable resources on school or state lands, other

than those lands granted for other specific purposes; and
(d) other revenues as appropriated by the Legislature.
The State School Fund principal shall be safely invested
and held by the state in perpetuity. The interest of the
State School Fund only shall be expended for the support
of the public elementary and secondary schools. The
Legislature by statute may provide for necessary
administrative costs. The State School Fund shall be
guaranteed by the state against loss or diversion.
Utah Constitution, Article XX, §1:
All lands of the State that have been, or may hereafter
be granted to the State by Congress, and all lands
acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any person or
corporation, or that may otherwise be acquired, are
hereby accepted, and declared to be the public lands of
the State; and shall be held in trust for the people, to
be disposed of as may be provided by law, for the
respective purposes for which they have been or may be
granted, donated, devised or otherwise acquired.

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-1 (1953 as amended):
(1) (a) On the effective date of this act, the Board of
State Lands shall be increased in membership from eight
to nine members comprised as follows: one member is to be
the state superintendent of public instruction, or such
other person designated by the State Board of Education,
one member knowledgeable in matters pertaining to
forestry and fire control, and each of the remaining
seven members are to be representative of one of the
following districts:
District 1 - Box Elder, Cache, Weber, and Davis Counties;
District 2 - Beaver, Garfield, Iron, Kane, and Washington
Counties;
District 3 - Summit, Rich, Morgan, and Wasatch Counties;
District 4 - Juab, Millard, Piute, Sanpete, Sevier, and
Wayne Counties;
District 5 - Carbon, Emery, Grand, and San Juan Counties;
District 6 - Daggett, Duchesne, and Uintah Counties;
District 7 - Utah, Salt Lake, and Tooele Counties,
(b) The incumbent appointed members of the board
shall remain as members of the board for the balance of
the terms of office for which they were appointed. The
governor shall appoint the member of the board
representing district 3, with the advice and consent of
the Senate, to a term of office expiring on March 1,
1987.
(2)
Upon expiration of the terms of office of the
incumbent appointed members of the board or the one
member
appointed
under
Subsection
(1)(b),
their
successors shall be appointed by the governor, with the
advice and consent of the Senate, from each of the
districts provided for in Subsection (1)(a), and shall be
appointed for terms of office of four years each. Not
more than four members shall be from the same political
party. Vacancies occurring among the appointed members
of the board by reason of death, resignation, or other
cause shall be filled by the appointment of another
person by the governor, with the advise and consent of
the Senate, for the unexpired term of the person whose
office was vacated and shall be from the district
provided for in Subsection (1)(a) as to which the vacancy
has thus occurred.
(3)
Upon the first expiration of terms of appointed
members following the effective date of this act, and
thereafter one of the successors appointed under
Subsection (2) of this section shall be actively engaged
in a livestock grazing operation using state lands.
(4)
The board shall appoint its chairman from its
membership, and five members of the board shall
constitute a quorum for the transaction of business and
for the holding of hearings.

Utah Code Ann., §65-1-18(3) (1953 as amended):
The form of all applications, mineral leases, and other
relevant instruments shall be prescribed by the board.
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-23 (1953 as amended):
Except as otherwise provided by law, the State Land Board
shall by rules and regulations prescribe the form of
application, the form of lease, the annual rental, the
amount of royalty and the basis upon which the royalty
shall be computed, and such other details as it may deem
necessary in the interest of the state.
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-76 (1953 as amended):
All leases and contracts of every kind entered into by
the State Land Board shall before execution by such board
be approved as to form by the attorney general.
Utah Code Ann., §65-1-97 (1953 as amended):
The State Land Board may make and enforce rules and
regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this
act for carrying the same into effect.
Utah Code Ann., §65A-l-2(3) (1953 as amended):
(a) Policies shall be consistent with the Utah Enabling
Act, the Utah Constitution, and state law.
(b) The board shall adopt rules under Title 63, Chapter
46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, necessary to
fulfill the purposes of this title.
Utah Code Ann., §78-2-2(3) (f) and (j) (1953 as amended):
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review
informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under
Subsection (e);
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of record
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original
appellate jurisdiction.

UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED
30 U.S.C. §207 (a):
[A] lease shall require payment of a royalty in such
amount as the Secretary shall determine of not less than
12 1/2 per centum of the value of coal as defined by
regulation, except the Secretary may determine a lesser
amount in the case of coal recovered by underground
mining operations.,..
CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS
43 C.F.R. §3473.3-2:
2.
A lease shall require payment of a royalty of not
less than 12 1/2 percent of the value of the coal removed
from a surface mine.
3.
A lease shall require payment of royalty of not less
than 8 percent of the value of the coal removed from an
underground mine, except that the authorized officer
(Minerals Management Service) may determine a lesser
amount, but in no case less than 5 percent if conditions
warrant.
RULES & REGULATIONS GOVERNING
THE ISSUANCE OF MINERAL LEASES
of the Utah Board of State Lands & Forestry
and the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry
Revised to Include Amendments Effective:

November 4, 1982

Rule 3(C)(2) An overdue royalty fee of 1.5% per month
shall be charged on any amounts of production royalty
which are owing the State and have not been paid within
the time limit specified in the mineral lease under which
such production royalty is due.
Revised to Include Amendments Effective:

December 26, 1983

Rule 3(C)(2)
Payment of a 6% penalty fee shall be
required of lessee on all delinquent royalty.
In
addition, lessee shall be required to pay lessor interest
fees of 1.5 % per month on all amounts of outstanding
overdue royalty.
Revised to Include Amendments Effective:

July 1, 1986

Rule M3a2(5)(f)
Interest
shall be compounded
semiannually based on the average adjusted prime rate,
rounded to the nearest full percent, for each six-month
period computed from April to September and October to

March (as published by the Internal Revenue Service),
plus four percent (4%) .
The interest rate will be
subject to change at six-month intervals every July 1st,
and January 1st, This interest rate will be applied to
any delinquent royalty and will be in effect until
payment is received.
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scribed in section 59-l-401(3)(a) and states
in pertinent part: "The penalty for underpayment of tax is as follows: (a) If any
underpayment of tax is due to negligence
the penalty is 10% of the underpayment"
The Tax Commission found that Tummurru's failure to collect and pay the sales
taxes was due to negligence. It is within
the discretion of the Tax Commission
whether to assess penalties for failure to
pay taxes.13 The findings of the Tax Commission will not be overturned on appeal
unless the party challenging the findings
can show that they are contrary to law or
otherwise erroneous.14
Tummurru has not upheld its burden on
appeal to show that the Tax Commission
erred with regard to the assessment of the
sales taxes, interest, and penalties. The
decision and order of the Tax Commission
are affirmed.
HOWE, Associate C.J., and STEWART,
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.

PLATEAU MINING COIVIPANY, a Dela.
ware Corporation, and Cyprus Western
Coal Equipment Company, a Delaware
Corporation, Plaintiffs and Appellees
v.
The UTAH DIVISION OF STATE LANDS
AND FORESTRY, Ralph Miles, Director of the Division of State Lands
and Forestry, Utah Department of Natural Resources, Dee Hansen, Executive
Director of the Utah Department of
Natural Resources, Defendants and Appellants.
BLACKHAWK COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
The UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
CONSOLIDATION COAL COMPANY,
The Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining
Company, Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
The UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
The UTAH DIVISION OF STATE
LANDS AND FORESTRY, et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
Nos. 880120, 880215, 880243 and 880300.
Supreme Court of Utah.
Nov. 20, 1990.
Mining companies brought actions for
declaratory judgments against Division of

13. See Robert H. Hinckley, Inc. v. State Tax Div.,
17 Utah 2d 70, 404 P.2d 662, 669 (Utah 1965).
14. See, e.g., Benevolent and Protective Order of
Elks No. 85 v. Tax Comm'n, 536 P.2d 1214, 1219

(Utah 1975); Butler v. State Tax Comm'n, 13
Utah 2d 1, 367 P.2d 852, 853 (1962); McKendrick v. State Tax Comm'n, 9 Utah 2d 418, 347
P.2d 177, 178 (1959).
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State Lands and Forestry for an adjudication of liability under royalty provisions of
coal leases. The Seventh District, Carbon
County, Boyd Bunnell, J., entered summary
judgment in favor of the companies. State
appealed. The Supreme Court, Stewart, J.,
held that: (1) material issues of fact precluded summary judgment on issues of
whether prevailing federal rate was higher,
and thus whether companies breached their
duty to pay at the higher rate; (2) evidence
did not support estopping the State from
seeking to collect at a higher rate; (3)
companies would be given opportunity to
present evidence which would support a
finding of estoppel; (4) State's interpretation and attempted application of lease did
not amount to rule making; and (5) State
was not barred from recovery by laches.
Reversed and remanded.
1. Appeal and Error e=842(2), 863
Supreme Court will review the trial
court's grant of summary judgment for
correctness, giving no particular deference
to the trial court's conclusions of law.
2. Judgment <3=>183
The filing of cross motions for summary judgment does not necessarily mean
that material issues of fact do not exist
3. Contracts <3=>152
The plain meaning rule preserves the
intent of the parties and protects a contract
against judicial revision.
4. Evidence <3=>448
While parol evidence is generally not
admissible to explain the intent of a contract which is clear on its face, if a contract
is ambiguous, parol evidence is admissible
to explain the parties' intent.
5. Contracts
Whether
question of
before parol

<s=>176(2)
a contract is ambiguous is a
law which must be decided
evidence is admitted.

6. Contracts <3=>176(2)
When an ambiguity in a contract exists, the intent of the parties is a question
°f fact to be determined by the jury, and
failure to resolve an ambiguity by deter-

mining parties' intent from parol evidence
IS error.
7. Contracts <S=>170(1)
If a contract is ambiguous, the court
may consider the parties' actions and performance as evidence of the parties' true
intention.
8. Contracts <S=>143(2)
A contract provision is not necessarily
ambiguous just because one party gives
that provision a different meaning than
another party does, but rather to demonstrate ambiguity, contrary positions of the
parties must each be tenable.
9. Mines and Minerals <3=>5.2(1)
Ambiguity in alternative royalty provision in coal leases should not have ended
the trial court's inquiry into the alternative
provision, but rather, the trial court should
have received evidence to determine the
meaning of the terms in the provision.
10. Mines and Minerals <3=>5.2(1)
Alternative rate provision in coal leases were not unenforceable on basis of ambiguity, even if extrinsic evidence had been
adduced to determine how federal rate
should be calculated, what the federal rate
was, and when it became prevailing; alternative rate provision was based on prevailing federal rate clause and provided a practicable method by which appropriate royalty could be determined.
11. Contracts e=>228
An agreement which sets a price that
is determined by factors outside the contract, such as a market price or the price in
another contract, is valid and enforceable.
12. Mines and Minerals <s=5.2(l)
State's acceptance of lower royalty
payments under coal leases was not a practical construction of the leases by the State
that the lower royalty rate was rate the
lessees should pay, in that lessees were
responsible for calculating alternative federal prevailing royalty payments for royalty reporting form that they had to submit
to the State, and State had a right to rely
on good faith of its lessees in calculating
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the royalty and submitting the required
information.
13. Mines and Minerals <3=>5.2(1)
Alternative royalty provision in coal
leases required lessees to determine whether prevailing federal rate was higher and to
pay at that rate, and did not require any
affirmative action by State; lessees covenanted and agreed to pay whichever rate
was higher and were required to prepare
and forward a certified statement of
amount of production, and determinations
"of lessees were not binding on the State.
14. Estoppel <s=>62.2(2)
State would not be estopped from collecting increased royalties under alternative rate provision in coal leases unless
injustice would result and there would be
no substantial adverse effect on public policy.
15. Estoppel e=62.2(2)
There was no injustice in requiring
coal companies which leased coal mines to
pay royalties at prevailing federal rate, under alternative royalty provision, and thus
State would not be estopped from seeking
to collect increased royalties on that basis;
lessees knew that the leases required them
to pay at the "prevailing" rate.

rate, to estop the State would be to contravene the important public policy that State
should recover full value from lease of
school trust land, State's acceptance of low.
er rate was not inconsistent with lease provision, and companies were not without
fault, evidence did not indicate.
19. Mines and Minerals <S=>5.2(1)
Trial court, on remand of action seeking determination of liability of coal companies to pay increased royalty payments to
State under coal leases, would be required
to determine prevailing federal rate for
land of similar character; alternative rate
provision provided for payment of prevailing federal rate.
20. Estoppel ®=>62.2(2)
Coal companies would be given opportunity on remand to present evidence which
would support a finding that State should
be estopped from seeking to collect increased royalties under alternative rate
provision in coal leases due to past acceptance of lower royalties.
21. Estoppel <S=>52.10(3)
Mere silence is not a waiver unless
there is some duty or obligation to speak.

16. Public Lands <s>51
State acts as a trustee and its duties
are the same as the duties of other trustees
when the State is administering school
trust lands.

22. Estoppel <s=>62.2(2)
State's acceptance of royalty payments
under coal leases in amounts less than the
amount owed did not waive State's right to
seek to collect full payment.

17. Public Lands <3=>54(6)
State's duty of loyalty to beneficiaries
of school trust lands includes the duty not
to act in the interest of a third party at the
expense of the beneficiaries by disposing of
trust property for less than the agreed
price.

23. Administrative Law and Procedure
<s=*383
Mines and Minerals ®=>5.2(1)
State's interpretation of coal leases to
require increased payments under alternative royalty provision was not a new royalty policy for which the State was required
to comply with procedures of Administrative Rulemaking Act U.C.A.1953, 6346a-l to 63-46a-16, 63-46a-2(8)(a), (14).

18. Estoppel <^62.2(2)
State would not be estopped from obtaining royalty payments at prevailing federal rate from coal companies under alternative rate provision in coal leases on
school trust land; there was no injustice in
requiring the companies to pay royalties at
prevailing federal rate when they knew
that lease required them to pay at such

24. Equity <S=>72(1)
"Laches," which bars a recovery when
there has been a delay by one party causing a disadvantage to the other party, re*
quires a lack of diligence on the part of the
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claimant and an injury to the defendant
because of a lack of diligence.
Sec publication Words and Phrases
for other judicial constructions and
definitions.
25. Mines and Minerals e=>5.2(l)
State was not barred from recovery of
increased royalty fees under coal leases by
doctrine of laches; lessee defaulted in performance of duty to pay at prevailing federal rate.
26. Mines and Minerals <S=>5.2(1)
Trial court on remand was required to
consider whether coal company could be
liable for delinquent interest and penalties
for failing to pay proper royalty under coal
leases.
R. Paul Van Dam, Gayle F. McKeachnie,
Clark B. Allred, David S. Christensen, Salt
Lake City, for Utah State Lands and Forestry.
James M. Elegante, Patricia J. Winmill,
Lucy B. Jenkins, Kenneth R. Barrett, Salt
Lake City, for Plateau Min. Co.
Hugh C. Garner, Salt Lake City, for
Blackhawk Coal Co.
Keith E. Taylor, Patricia J. Winmill, Lucy
B Jenkins, Kenneth R. Barrett, Salt Lake
City, for Consolidation Coal Co.
Calvin L. Rampton, Richard B. Johns,
Salt Lake City, for Trail Mountain Coal Co.
STEWART, Justice:
The plaintiffs in this consolidated case,
four mining companies, brought actions for
declaratory judgments against the Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry (the
"State") for an adjudication of their liability under the royalty provisions of certain
coal leases. The State appeals summary
judgments in favor of the four mining companies.
I. FACTS
The issues in each of these consolidated
cases arise out of the same standard lease
form. The leased land is school trust land.
!

- Currently Utah Code Ann. §§ 65A-1-4, -4-3,

A brief explanation of the nature of school
trust lands provides a background for the
application of the governing legal principles. When Utah became a state, the United States granted lands to the State for the
support of the common schools. Utah Enabling Act §§ 6, 10, 28 Stat. ch. 138, at 107
(1894). The state of Utah accepted those
lands for that purpose. Utah Const, art.
XX, § 1.
The Utah Division of State Lands and
Forestry is charged with the duty of administering those lands. Utah Code Ann.
§ 65-1-14 (1986).» The State leased lands
located in Carbon and Emery Counties for
the mining of coal to the predecessor of
Plateau Mining Company in 1965, the
predecessor of Blackhawk Coal Company in
1960, the predecessor of Consolidation Coal
Company in 1968, and the predecessor of
Trail Mountain Coal Company in 1965.
A standard lease form prepared by the
State was used in each of the transactions.
It authorized the lessee to extract coal in
exchange for a royalty specified in Article
III of the lease. The royalty provision
states:
The Lessee, in consideration of the granting of the rights and privileges aforesaid,
hereby covenants and agrees as follows:
SECOND: To pay to Lessor quarterly,
on or before the 15th day of the month
succeeding each quarter, royalty
(a) at the rate of 15c per ton of 2000
lbs. of coal produced from the leased
premises and sold or otherwise disposed
of, or
(b) at the rate prevailing, at the beginning of the quarter for which payment is
being made, for federal lessees of land of
similar character under coal leases issued
by the United States at that time, whichever is higher
The lease also stated: "This lease is
granted subject in all respects to and under
the conditions of the laws of the State of
Utah and existing rules and regulations
and such operating rules and regulations
as may be hereafter approved and adopted
-7-1 (Supp.1990).
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by the State Land Board." The lessee was
required to prepare and submit quarterly
to the State a certified statement reporting
the amount of production of the mine and
any other information the State required.
Plaintiffs mined coal under these leases
during various periods and paid royalties
under paragraph "second," subdivision (a)
of the leases. The royalty reporting forms
provided by the State required a report of
"Royalty Data," on a form which had two
columns that corresponded to the alternative royalty provisions, one headed "c/T
Basis" (i.e. cents per ton) and the other
"Percentage Basis." Each column provided the formula for calculating a royalty on
the basis stated. Throughout the entire
term of these leases, plaintiffs completed
the column entitled "e/T Basis" and paid
the 15c per ton royalty except for Consolidation, which paid at a rate of 17.5c per
ton. The State accepted these statements
and royalty payments without objection.

ond (b) of the lease. Blackhawk responded
with a letter dated January 7,1982, statin?
"Blackhawk will continue to pay to th
State, on a quarterly basis, the royalty of
15c per ton in compliance with Article IH(a\
of the original lease agreement, since the
provisions of Article 111(b) are inapplicable
at the present time." Blackhawk continued to pay the royalty at the rate of 1^
per ton until 1983, when the mine ceased
production.
In December 1984, the State began to
audit its coal leases. The audit included an
analysis of the United States Bureau of
Land Management records on federal coal
leases and an examination of the records of
the state coal lessees. The auditors found
that the royalty rate on newly issued federal coal leases had increased to 8% in 1977
and that the plaintiffs had failed to report
and pay royalties at the higher federal
rate. After further consideration by another audit committee, the State demanded
payment from the mining companies for
delinquent royalties, interest, and penalties
for the period April 1, 1979, to December
31, 1984. The State demanded $2,991,613.44 from Plateau; $3,150,742.93 from
Blackhawk; $197,193.09 from Consolidation; and $5,222,197.20 from Trail Mountain.

The federal coal lease royalty rate generally remained at 15c per ton until 1976,
when Congress enacted the Federal Coal
Leasing Amendments Act, 90 Stat. 1083
(1976). This Act allowed the Secretary of
the Interior to promulgate regulations increasing the federal royalty rate on newly
issued leases of underground mines to 87f
of the value of the coal produced. 43
The plaintiffs requested hearings before
C.F.R. § 3473.3-2(a)(3) (1979). All the
the Board of State Lands. Hearings were
plaintiffs subsequently entered into leases
held, and the audit findings upheld. The
with the federal government at the 87<
plaintiffs then filed actions for declaratory
rate.
judgments to declare the Board's decisions
Although the federal rate had increased, invalid. In the Trail Mountain case, Trail
the plaintiffs continued to pay royalties at Mountain and the State stipulated that the
the lower 15c per ton rate except that Division of State Lands relied upon each
Consolidation paid 17.5c. In 1980, the coal lessee to provide accurate production
State represented to Plateau that its lease and royalty information on the royalty rewas in good standing, and in May 1985, the porting form. They also stipulated that
State represented to Cyprus Western Coal after 1976, all new federal coal leases isEquipment Company, a successor to Pla- sued for underground mines provided, with
teau, that Plateau royalty payments were few exceptions, for an 8^ royalty rate, that
current. Thereafter, Cyprus acquired Pla- most federal coal leases were readjusted
teau.
between 1979 and 1985 and increased to a
However, in 1982 the State notified royalty rate of 8% of value, and that
Blackhawk that it expected to receive "fu- management at Trail Mountain was aware
ture royalty payments at the same rate of the Federal Coal Leasing Amendments
prevailing for similar federal coal leases in Act and the regulations promulgated purthe area" under Article III, paragraph sec- suant to the Act.
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In granting the plaintiffs summary judgment, the trial court held that (1) the royalty provision in each lease was ambiguous;
(2) the plaintiffs were not required to determine and apply the correct royalty rate; (3)
the State was estopped from collecting past
royalties through a retroactive audit; and
(4) the State could not collect interest and
penalties from the mining companies. In
short, the trial court ruled that the plaintiffs owed nothing under the terms of their
leases. The State appealed.
II. CONTRACT INTERPRETATION

[4,5] Parol evidence is generally not
admissible to explain the intent of a contract which is clear on its face. Faulkner
v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah
1983). But if a contract is ambiguous,
parol evidence is admissible to explain the
parties' intent. Colonial Leasing Co. v.
Larsen Bros. Constr. Co., 731 P.2d 483,
487 (Utah 1986); Faulkner, 665 P.2d at
1293. Whether a contract is ambiguous is
a question of law which must be decided
before parol evidence is admitted. Faulkner, 66b P.2d at 1293. "[A] motion for
summary judgment may not be granted if
a legal conclusion is reached that an ambiguity exists in the contract and there is a
factual issue as to what the parties intended." Id.

[1,2] The trial court held as a matter of
law that the alternative royalty provision in
the lease, Article 111(b), was ambiguous
and therefore unenforceable. We review
[6,7] When ambiguity does exist, the
the trial court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, giving no particular intent of the parties is a question of fact to
deference to the trial court's conclusions of be determined by the jury. Colonial Leaslaw. Ron Case Roofing and Asphalt Pav- ing Co., 731 P.2d at 488. Failure to reing, Inc. v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 solve an ambiguity by determining the par(Utah 1989); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d ties' intent from parol evidence is error.
245, 247 (Utah 1988). In determining Winegar v. Smith Inv. Co., 590 P.2d 348,
whether a material issue of fact exists, we 350 (Utah 1979). If a contract is ambigudo not defer to a trial court's conclusion on ous, the court may consider the parties'
the matter. The filing of cross-motions for actions and performance as evidence of the
summary judgment does not necessarily parties' true intention. Zeese v. Estate of
mean that material issues of fact do not Siegel, 534 P.2d 85, 90 (Utah 1975); Bullexist. Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design frog Marina, Inc. v. Lentz, 28 Utah 2d 261,
268, 501 P.2d 266, 271 (1972); Bullough v.
Assocs., 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981).
Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304, 309, 400 P.2d 20, 23
[3] In ruling that the alternative royal- (1965).
ty provision in Article 111(b) was unenforceable, the trial court departed from estab[8] The trial court held the royalty prolished rules of contract interpretation. vision ambiguous because the amount due
"The basic rule of contract interpretation is was "based on several factors not immedithat the intent of the parties is to be ascer- ately capable of definitive determination."
tained from the content of the instrument However, a contract provision is not necesitself
Each contract provision is to be sarily ambiguous just because one party
considered in relation to all of the others, gives that provision a different meaning
with a view toward giving effect to all and than another party does. Buehner Block
ignoring none." Utah Valley Bank v. Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895
Tanner, 636 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (Utah (Utah 1988). To demonstrate ambiguity,
1981); Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, the contrary positions of the parties must
1107-08 (Utah 1982). The plain meaning each be tenable. See, e.g., Grow v. Marrule preserves the intent of the parties and wick Dev., Inc., 621 P.2d 1249, 1252 (Utah
protects the contract against judicial revi- 1980). Even if a provision is not "immedis
*on. Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Unionameri- ately capable of definitive determination,"
ca, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982); that does not necessarily make the proviUtah Valley Bank, 636 P.2d at 1061.
sion unenforceable.
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[9,10] Thus, ambiguity in the royalty
provision in the leases should not have
ended the inquiry. Rather, the trial court
should have received evidence to determine
the meaning of the terms in the provision.
The language of the lease provision is
clear. The intent of the parties was that
the higher of the two rates should be paid
the State. If ambiguity exists, it arises
from the language that the "prevailing federal rate" shall be paid when it is higher
than the c/T rate. Extrinsic evidence will,
no doubt, have to be adduced to determine
how that federal rate was to be calculated,
what the rate was, and when it became
"prevailing," if it did.
It follows that the trial court should not
have held the alternative rate provision unenforceable because it is ambiguous. Professor Corbin states, "An agreement is not
unenforceable for lack of definiteness of
price or amount if the parties specify a
practicable method by which the amount
can be determined by the court without any
new expression by the parties themselves."
1 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 98, at
433-34 (1963). It is only necessary that
there be a reasonable method by which the
court can determine the amount owed. In
Ferris v. Jennings, 595 P.2d 857 (Utah
1979), this Court stated on a somewhat
related issue:
We have no disagreement with the
general proposition that a contract will
not be specifically enforced unless the
obligations of the parties are "set forth
with sufficient definiteness that it can be
performed." But to be considered therewith is the further proposition that the
parties to a contract are obliged to proceed in good faith to cooperate in performing the contract in accordance with
its expressed intent. A contract is not
fatally defective as to price if there is an
agreement as to some formula or method
for fixing it.
595 P.2d at 859 (quoting Bunnell v. Bills,
13 Utah 2d 83, 86, 368 P.2d 597, 600 (1962))
(footnotes omitted).
[11] Thus, an agreement which sets a
price that is determined by factors outside
the contract, such as a market price or the

price in another contract, is valid and enforceable. States Marine Lines, Inc. v
Crooks, 13 N.Y.2d 206, 218-14, 245 Ny
S.2d 581, 586-87, 195 N.E.2d 296, 3OQ
(1963); Bruce v. Blalock, 241 S.C. 155, 127
S.E.2d 439 (1962); Combs v. Frigid Foods
Products, Inc., 67 Wash.2d 862, 866, 4io
P.2d 780, 782 (1966). Indeed, the validity
of leases calling for royalties based on market price does not appear to be at issue in
most cases. See Foster v. Atlantic Refining Co., 329 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.1964);
Holmes v. Kewanee Oil Co., 233 Kan. 544,
664 P.2d 1335 (1983), cert, denied, 474 U.s!
953, 106 S.Ct. 322, 88 L.Ed.2d 305 (1985);
Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429 S.W.2d
866 (Tex.1968); State v. Moncrief, 720 P.2d
470 (Wyo.1986).
The alternative rate provision, based on
the prevailing federal rate clause, provides
a practicable method by which the appropriate royalty can be determined. In 1976,
Congress enacted the Federal Coal Leasing
Amendments Act, which provides in part:
A lease shall require payment of a royalty in such amount as the Secretary shall
determine of not less than 12V2 per centum of the value of coal as defined by
regulation, except the Secretary may determine a lesser amount in the case of
coal recovered by underground mining
operations.
30 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1988). The regulations
promulgated under the Act provide:
(a)(1) Royalty rates shall be determined
on an individual case basis prior to lease
issuance. For competitive leases, initial
royalty rates shall be set out in the notice of lease sale.
(2) A lease shall require payment of a
royalty of not less than I2V2 percent of
the value of the coal removed from a
surface mine.
(3) A lease shall require payment of a
royalty of not less than 8 percent of the
value of coal removed from an underground mine, except that the authorized
officer may determine a lesser amount,
but in no case less than 5 percent if
conditions warrant.
43 C.F.R. § 3473.3-2 (1989).
The alternative rate provision is sufficiently clear to be enforceable. If there is
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ambiguity as to how the prevailing federal
^te clause should be applied, the trial
court should admit parol evidence to clarify
its construction. The trial court's granting
of plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment under these circumstances was inappropriate.
Consolidation asserts that it agreed with
the State in 1981 that the prevailing federal
rate was 17.5c per ton, the same as in its
federal lease at the time. If such an agreement were made, it may be relevant to the
interpretation of the prevailing federal rate
provision, as it applies to Consolidation.
Consolidation also asserts that its agreement fixed the rate at 17.5c until readjustment in January 1988. Because the matter
was decided on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court did not determine
whether the parties entered into such an
agreement, and our review of the record
does not reveal any evidence which supports Consolidation's claim that the rate
was fixed until 1988. The matter may, of
course, be decided in a trial on the merits.
[12] Evidence of the parties' course of
conduct might also be relevant. The plaintiffs argue, and the trial court held, that
the parties established a course of conduct
to the effect that royalty payments should
be based on the 15c-per-ton rate, the implication being that the parties adopted a
construction of the lease contrary to the
prevailing federal rate provision. The
State's acceptance of the lower rate, however, does not show a practical construction
of the lease by the State that the lower
royalty rate was the rate the plaintiffs
should pay. The plaintiffs were responsible for calculating the alternative federal
prevailing royalty payments for the royalty
reporting form that they had to submit to
the State. The State had a right to rely on
the good faith of its lessees in calculating
the royalty and submitting the required
information.
Furthermore, the plaintiffs' argument, if
accepted, would in effect read the alternative royalty provision out of the lease. The
doctrine of practical construction can have
n
<> such force on these facts. Professor

Corbin has explained the governing principles:
There are many other bases of [contract] interpretation besides the practical
application base. The present doctrine
does not cause them to be discarded;
indeed, they may produce a de[g]ree of
conviction that overpowers inferences to
be drawn from practical application by
the parties. When such is the case, the
court may say that when the meaning of
the contract is plain and unambiguous, a
different meaning will not be adopted on
the basis of practical application by the
parties. In saying this, however, the
court should not mean that the words of
the contract define themselves; instead,
it should first consider carefully all the
usual sources and methods of interpretation, including the practical interpretation of the parties.
3 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts § 558, at
258 (footnote omitted). The State's acceptance of royalty payments based on the
lower 15c-per-ton rate, as calculated by
the plaintiffs, does not amount to knowledge that the higher rate was applicable
and does not prove that the State did not
intend to apply the alternative rate provision.
[13] The plaintiffs also claim that the
alternative royalty provision was not selfexecuting and placed no responsibility on
them to calculate and pay the higher federal rate without some affirmative action on
the part of the State. The trial court
agreed and held that the provision was
"not self-executing as to create a legal
obligation on the lessee
" That conclusion ignores the plain language of the
lease. Article III of the lease states that
the lessee "covenants and agrees" to pay
whichever rate is higher. Further, under
Article III, the lessees were required to
prepare and forward a certified statement
of the amount of production. The State did
not instruct the plaintiffs to pay any specific amount or rate. Throughout the terms
of the leases, the plaintiffs completed the
royalty reporting form by filling out the
column headed "c/T Basis" and leaving
blank the column headed "Percentage Basis." Although the plaintiffs were initially
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responsible for determining the proper royalty rate and the total amount owed, those
determinations are not binding on the
State. This conclusion is supported by R.
632-5-4 of the Utah Administrative Code
(1990), which states: 'The division shall
have the right at reasonable times and
intervals to audit the books and records of
any lessee . . . and to inspect the leased . . .
premises and conduct field audits for the
purpose of determining whether there has
been compliance with the rules or the
terms of agreement."
In sum, the plaintiffs had the duty to
determine whether the prevailing federal
rate was higher and, if so, to pay at that
rate. The alternative royalty provision did
not require any affirmative action by the
State. Summary judgment on this issue
was inappropriate.
III. ESTOPPEL
The trial court ruled as a matter of law
that the State was estopped from obtaining
royalty payments at the prevailing federal
rate. The court held that in entering the
lease, the State acted in a proprietary capacity, that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied against the State, and that even
if the State were acting in a governmental
capacity, it was still estopped because there
was no substantial effect on public policy.
The State argues that the facts do not
support a finding of estoppel and that estoppel is not available when the State acts
in its governmental capacity, as it asserts it
did. Because the requirements of estoppel
are not met, it is not necessary to decide
whether the State acted in a governmental
or proprietary capacity when leasing school
trust lands.
Generally, estoppel may not be asserted
against the State. Utah State Univ. v.
Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982).
However, there is an exception to this rule
"when its rigid application would defeat,
2.

In Morgan v. Board of State Lands, 549 P.2d
695, 697 (Utah 1976), also dealing with school
trust lands, this Court stated:
Estoppel arises when a party (defendant
Board) by his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his silence when he ought to
speak, intentionally or through culpable negli-

rather than serve, the higher purpose that
all rules are intended to serve: that of
doing justice." Id. (footnote omitted)
Thus, in "unusual circumstances," when
the rule's "application would result in injus.
tice, and there would be no substantial
adverse effect on public policy, the courts
will honor the higher purpose of doing justice by invoking the exception
" /^
Under these circumstances, the State may
be estopped even when it acts in its governmental capacity. Celebrity Club, Inc. v.
Utah Liquor Control Comm'n, 602 P.2d
689, 694 (Utah 1979).
The elements of estoppel are "(1) an admission, statement, or act inconsistent with
the claim afterwards asserted, (2) action by
the other party on the faith of such admission, statement, or act, and (3) injury to
such other party resulting from allowing
the first party to contradict or repudiate
such admission, statement, or act/' Id.
(citing West IK Dep't of Social and Health
Services, 21 Wash.App. 577, 579, 586 P.2d
516, 518 (1978)).2 "Estoppel is a doctrine
of equity purposed to rescue from loss a
party who has, without fault, been deluded
into a course of action by the wrong or
neglect of another." Morgan v. Board of
State Lands, 549 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1976).
[14-17] The State may not be estopped
unless injustice would result and there
would be no substantial adverse effect on
public policy. There is no injustice in requiring the plaintiffs to pay royalties at the
prevailing federal rate when they knew
that the lease required them to pay at the
"prevailing" rate. Furthermore, it is important to consider that in administering
the school trust lands, the State acts as a
trustee and its duties are the same as the
duties of other trustees. Department of
State Lands v. PetUbone, 216 Mont. 361,
702 P.2d 948, 953-54 (1985); Oklahoma
Educ. Ass'n v. Nigh, 642 P.2d 230, 235-36
gence, induces another (plaintiffs) to believe
certain facts to exist and that such other
(plaintiffs) acting with reasonable prudence
and diligence, relies and acts thereon so thai
he will suffer an injustice if the former (Land
Board) is permitted to deny the existence of
such facts.
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(Okla.1982); County of Skamania v.
State, 102 Wash.2d 127, 132, 685 P.2d 576,
5J,0 (1984). The State's duty of loyalty to
the beneficiaries, see Restatement (Second)
of Trusts § 170 (1959), includes the duty
not to act in the interest of a third party at
the expense of the beneficiaries by disposing of trust property for less than the
agreed price. Id., comment q. The plaintiffs knew or should have known that the
leased lands were trust lands, and they also
knew that the lease required them to pay
the prevailing federal rate when it was the
higher rate. There is no injustice in requiring them to pay the royalty required by the
lease of the trust lands.

that the State may not be estopped is inapplicable under these circumstances.
Furthermore, the elements of equitable
estoppel have not been met. For an estoppel to arise, the State must have made an
admission, statement, or act inconsistent
with the position the State now takes. The
State's acceptance of the lower rate is not
inconsistent with the lease provision that
the plaintiffs are required to pay at the
higher of the two rates because the lessees
themselves were responsible for determining the proper rate at which royalty payments were made. Moreover, it cannot be
said on this record that the plaintiffs were
without fault or even that they acted with
reasonable prudence and diligence in ascertaining the correct rate to be paid. See
Morgan, 549 P.2d at 697.
The plaintiffs also argue that they would
have suffered substantial losses from mining under the State leases if they were
required to pay at the 8% rate and that
they would, therefore, have pursued other
options had they known the State would
require an 8% royalty payment. In entering into the leases, the plaintiffs were fully
aware that the 15e-per-ton rate was not
fixed for the term of the lease and that
they had no guarantee against having to
pay a higher royalty.

[18] Furthermore, to estop the State
would be to contravene the important public policy that the State should recover full
value from the lease of school trust land.
In Lassen v. Arizona ex rel Arizona
Highway Department, 385 U.S. 458, 466,
ST S.Ct. 584, 588, 17 L.Ed.2d 515 (1967), the
United States Supreme Court stated, in reference to school trust lands, that the state
must "receive the full value of any lands
transferred from it." Utah law also implicitly requires that the State obtain full value
for leases of school trust land. Article XX,
section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides
that state public lands "shall be held in
trust for the people, to be disposed of as
[19] Furthermore, although the State
may be provided b> law, for the respective asserts that it was entitled to an 8% royalpurposes for which they have been . . . ty, the federal regulations establishing roygranted." In Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, alty rates for underground mining do not
58 Utah 418, 433, 199 P. 670, 675 (1921), the state that an 8% rate is necessarily reCourt stated that this constitutional provi- quired. See Coastal States Energy Co. v.
sion is "an absolute limitation upon the Hodel, 816 F.2d 502, 507 (10th Cir.1987).
power of the state to dispose of the lands,
Under the regulations, a royalty in a federor permit them to be disposed of, except
al coal lease could require less than an 8%
for the purpose for which they were grantrate if conditions exist making it impossible
ed by Congress." Section 6 of the Ento operate a mine at a profit.3 On the
abling Act states the purpose for which
other hand, the State asserts that of twenthese lands are granted, which is "for the
support of common schools." If the State ty-three coal leases issued by the United
*ere estopped from obtaining full value for States Bureau of Land Management on
leases of school trust lands, the purpose of lands within the state of Utah between
the trust lands could be undermined. For January 1, 1979, and December 31, 1985,
these reasons, the exception to the rule eighteen required a royalty payment of 8%.
The plaintiffs themselves held federal leas3
lessee of making a profit.
- This is not to sa\ that the prevailing federal
r

ate provision of the state lease assures the
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es requiring 87< royalties. Because the ap- assurance, consummated the purchase of
propriate rate is the prevailing federal rate Plateau three months after the audit had
for land of similar character, the issue of been completed. The State, on the other
what that rate should be is to be deter- hand, argues that representations that the
lease was in good standing had no applies
mined by the trial court on remand.
4
The conclusion that the State is not es- tion to the amount of royalty to be paid
topped from collecting additional royalties The State also argues that Cyprus and
after accepting royalties at the lower rate Plateau knew that the lease required payis supported by case law from other juris- ment at the higher of the two rates and
dictions. See Foster v. Atlantic Refining knew that they were dealing with school
Co., 329 F.2d 485, 490 (5th Cir.1964) trust land. Furthermore, it is possible that
("[Acceptance by the lessors of less royal- Plateau and Cyprus made arrangements
ty than that to which they were entitled for such a contingency in their purchase
does not 'extinguish the entire debt nor agreement. If so, this may have some
work an estoppel.'" (quoting Arkansas bearing on the issue of estoppel against the
Natural Gas Corp. v. Sartor, 98 F.2d 527, State. Although summary judgment on
530 (5th Cir.1938))). See also Holmes v. the issue of estoppel was improper, the
Kewanee Oil Co., 233 Kan. 544, 550, 664 plaintiffs might be able to present evidence
at trial which would support a finding of
P.2d 1335, 1341 (1983), cert, denied, A1A
estoppel. This is an issue to be determined
U.S. 953, 106 S.Ct. 322, 88 L.Ed.2d 305
by the trial court.
(1985); Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Vela, 429
S.W.2d 866, 875-76 (Tex.1968). An inter[21] Plateau and Blackhawk also argue
esting comparison may be made to federal that the State waived its right to enforce
mineral and gas leases, under which accept- the alternative royalty provision. Alance of royalties is made subject to subse- though the issue of waiver was presented
quent audit. See Arch Mineral Corp. v. to the trial court, it did not rule on the
Lujan, 911 F.2d 408, 411 (10th Cir.1990); issue. We state the law here for guidance
Shell Offshore Inc., 115 IBLA 205, 211 to the trial court in deciding this issue on
(July 3, 1990). Although no language in remand. " 'A waiver is the intentional rethe leases at issue specifically makes the linquishment of a known right.' " Amerileases subject to subsequent audit, the can Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Blomquist, 21
leases are implicitly subject to such a limi- Utah 2d 289, 292, 445 P.2d 1, 3 (1968)
tation by virtue of the acknowledged right (quoting Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Heath, 90
of the State to audit the books and records Utah 187, 194, 61 P.2d 308, 311 (1936)).
of the plaintiffs to determine compliance Mere silence is not a waiver unless there is
with the leases. Utah Admin.Code R. 632- some duty or obligation to speak. Dalton
5-4 (1990).
v. LeBlanc, 350 F.2d 95, 98-99 (10th Cir.
[20] Although the State's acceptance of 1965).
royalty payments at the lower rate is not a
sufficient ground for invoking the doctrine
of estoppel, there may be additional facts
which could justify estoppel against the
State. For example, Plateau, or more specifically its co-plaintiff and purchaser Cyprus, asserts that the state audit had uncovered the deficiency in royalty payments,
but the State nevertheless assured Cyprus
that the lease was in good standing. Plateau claims that Cyprus, relying on that

[22] The State's acceptance of royalty
payments in amounts less than the amount
owed does not mean that the State waived
its right to full payment. In Holmes, the
Kansas Supreme Court stated that acceptance by a lessor of an amount "less than
was owed under the terms of the leases"
did not constitute a waiver. 233 Kan. at
550, 664 P.2d at 1341. "This issue has
been resolved in the royalty owners' favor
on numerous occasions." Id. We agree

4. The State also claims that the plaintiffs were
not entitled to rely on the unauthorized or erroneous statements of government employees.

The trial court did not consider this issue, and
we do not address it on appeal.

PLATEAU MIN. v. UTAH DIV. OF STATE LANDS

Utah

731

Cite as 802 P.2d 720 (Utah 1990)

that the State has not impliedly waived its
right to a higher royalty by acceptance of
the lesser royalty for a period when the
higher royalty should have been paid.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
[23] Plateau, Consolidation, and Blackhawk argue on appeal that the State's interpretation of the lease is essentially a
new royalty policy and that the State cannot adopt such a policy unless it complies
with the procedures of the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46a-l to -16 (1986). The trial court
did not address this issue, although the
three plaintiffs raised it below.

3, 1990), the Minerals Management Service
(MMS) had prepared a procedure paper setting out criteria by which royalties were to
be calculated from oil and gas leases. According to an audit conducted pursuant to
these criteria, Shell owed additional royalties for the years 1980-83. "Shell . . . argued that the Procedure Paper was improperly accorded retroactive effect, especially
where it represented a departure from
MMS' previous acceptance of Shell's reported prices over a period of many years
"
Id. at 208. In response to Shell's argument, the administrative judge stated: "On
numerous occasions we have reviewed and
rejected arguments that application of the
Procedure Paper constituted a retroactive
application of a new rule." Id. at 210.
Although federal administrative law does
not control the resolution of the issue, that
law is helpful. In the present case, the
State simply seeks to rely on a known lease
provision. The determination that a specific lease provision is enforceable is not rulemaking.

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-2(8)(a) (1986)
(currently § 63-46a-2(14) (Supp.1990)) provided:
"Rule" means a statement made by an
agency that applies to a general class of
persons, rather than specific persons
and: (i) implements or interprets policy
made by statute; or (ii) prescribes the
policy of the agency in the absence of
express statutory policy; or (iii) preV. LACHES
scribes the administration of the agen[24,25] Blackhawk argues that the
cy's functions or describes its organizaState is barred from recovery by the doction, procedures, and operations. "Rule"
trine of laches. The trial court did not
includes the amendment or repeal of an
decide this issue, but it was raised below by
existing rule.
Blackhawk. Laches bars a recovery when
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46a-3(4) (1986) (cur- there has been a delay by one party causrently § 63-46a-3(4) (1989)) provided:
ing a disadvantage to the other party. PaRulemaking is not required when:
panikolas Bros. Enters, v. Sugarhouse
(a) a procedure or standard is already Shopping Center Assocs.f 535 P.2d 1256,
described in statute;
1260 (Utah 1975). Laches has two ele(b) agency action affects an individual ments: (1) lack of diligence on the part of
person, not a class of persons;
the claimant and (2) an injury to the defen(c) agency action applies only to inter- dant because of the lack of diligence. Id.
nal agency procedures; or
at 1260. The State argues that it did not
(d) grammatical or other insignificant pursue this matter because it was the lesnile changes do not affect agency policy sees' duty to pay the proper royalty. Lachor the application or results of agency es is inapplicable in this case; it was Blackhawk that defaulted in the performance of
actions.
The State's interpretation and attempted its duty.
application of the lease provision at issue
VI. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
does not amount to rulemaking. See
Williams v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 720
Blackhawk also argues briefly that the
p
-2d 773, 776-77 (Utah 1986). A compari- State is barred from recovery on this claim
son to federal law is useful on this point. by the statute of limitations. Utah Code
J
n Shell Offshore lnc.t 115 IBLA 205 (July Ann. § 78-12-23(2) (1987) provides that an
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action on a written contract must be
brought within six years. The trial court
did not address this argument, and we decline to address it on appeal. At most, this
argument would excuse a few months of
delinquent royalty provisions. We leave
this question to the trial court to consider.
VII. INTEREST AND PENALTIES
[26] The State's audit of the leases
claimed charges for delinquent interest and
penalties for failing to pay the proper royalty. The trial court did not allow charges
because of its holding that the State could
not recover any delinquent payments, but
also gave other reasons why the State
could not recover interest and penalties.
Our reversal may affect the trial court's
analysis of this issue, and we leave the
matter for the trial court's determination.
We reverse the summary judgments in
favor of Plateau, Blackhawk, Consolidation, and Trail Mountain and remand for
further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion.
HALL, C.J., HOWE, A.C.J., and
DURHAM and ZIMMERMAN, JJ.,
concur.

trial in the Eighth District Court, Duches
County, Allen B. Sorensen, J. Defendant
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Greenwood, J., held that: (1) five-year statute of
limitations contained in Securities Act applied; (2) evidence was sufficient to sunport defendant's convictions; and (3) criminal defendants challenging sufficiency of
evidence following jury verdicts will be required to marshal the evidence.
Affirmed.

1. Criminal Law <§=>147
Five-year statute of limitations set
forth in Securities Act applied to defendant's criminal prosecution for securities
fraud, rather than four-year general felony
limitation period. U.C.A.1953, 61-1-21, 761-103(1), 76-1-302(1).
2. Statutes e=>223.4
Limitation periods contained within
specific statutes control over those of more
general statutes.
3. Criminal Law <s=>147
Statute of limitations included in same
act which defines a crime applies to that
crime unless otherwise clearly provided.
4. Criminal Law 01144.13(3, 5), 1159.2(7)

STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
Michael R. MOORE, Defendant
and Appellant.
No. 890558-CA.
Court of Appeals of Utah.
Nov. 8, 1990.
Defendant was convicted of eight
counts of securities fraud following jury

Court of Appeals will reverse jury's
guilty verdict on ground that evidence was
insufficient to support conviction only if
evidence, along with reasonable inferences
from evidence viewed in light most favorable to verdict, is so inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds
must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that defendant committed the crime of
which he was convicted; jury, not appellate
court, weighs evidence and assesses witness credibility, and so long as some evidence and reasonable inferences support
jury's findings, Court of Appeals will not
disturb them.
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AG.-ZZXZXT OF SUHLEASE
THIS AGREEMENT, mace as of t h i s 13th day of August,
19 79, by and between:

^

INEZ LOU FETTEROLF, Executrix of the Estate of Myron F. Fetterolf,
of Somerset County, Pennsylvania, hereinafter referred
t o as
"the E s t a t e , "
N
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY, a Utah corporation, doing business
w i t h i n t h e s t a t e of Utah, h e r e i n a f t e r referred t o as "Trail
Mountain. "
WITNESSETH

THAT:

/
WHEREAS, on August 13, 19 79, Myron F. Fetterolf acquired
I Utah State Coal Lease No7T2603 and on that date entered into an
\ oral sublease of his rights under said Lease to Trail Mountain
2 Coal Company which oral sublease was documented in writing by
/ legal counsel on November 9, 19 79, but was not signed by Myron
\F. Fetterolf prior to his death on June 9, 1980; and
WHEREAS, the Estate has now succeeded Myron F. Fetterolf
as the owner of the aforesaid Lease; and
WHEREAS, the Estate and Trail Mountain now deem it
advisable to execute this Agreement of Sublease which contains
all the same terms of the document provided by counsel on
November 9, 19 79;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Estate hereby sublets to Trail
Mountain, and Trail Mountain hereby sublets from the Estate, its
successors and assigns, the right to mine coal from that 640
acre parcel described as Section 36, Township 17 South, Range
6 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, Emery County, Utah and
such other rights which the Estate has under Utah State Coal
Lease No. 22603, a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1
and hereby made a part hereof (the "Premises"), under the following
terms and conditions:
1. Term. The term of the subleasing of the Premises
shall be for the term stated in Exhibit 1, and is intended to
continue until all of the coal in the Premises is mined to
exhaustion; provided; however, that the Estate shall have the
right to cancel the sublease in the event that Trail Mountain
becomes insolvent, bankrupt, or is in breach of its obligation
to pay royalties, or is in breach of other such obligations as
are provided below in paragraph 8.

, DEFENDANT'S

2. Tonnage Royalties. Trail Mountain shall pay to
the Estate and its successors and assions commencing as of
August 13, 1979, for each and every ton (2,000 pounds) of raw coal
renoved from the Premises a tonnage royalty, computed at eight
^ (8) percent of the net selling price ot the coal at the mine site,
trucking costs excluded. Payment is due by-the twenty-fifth
(25th) day following the month of sale or transportation of
such coal away from the site, whichever occurs first, and should

be eccc.Tpcr.ied by a correct statement of the quantity of coal
rer.cvei, along with such supporting documentation as is appropriate. All costs of production other than trucking costs are to
be bczr.e solely by Trail Mountain, and are not to be included in
computing the net selling price, and the tonnage royalty due
thereon.
3. Richt of Inspection. The Estate, its agent, or
any employee acting on its behalf, shall have the right during
business hours to enter the site and workings of Trail Mountain
for any reasonable purpose, and for the particular purpose of
ascertaining the amounts of coal removed from the Premises.
4. Terms and Conditions of Underlying Lease Bindino.
The subleasehoia granted hereunder by the Estate to Trail
"
Mountain is subject to the terms and conditions of the underlying lease held by the Estate from the State of Utah, a copy
of which is attached as Exhibit 1, except to the extent that
obligations thereunder or conditions thereof are enlarged in
favor of the Estate by this sublease, in which case Trail
Mountain is bound by the terms and conditions contained herein.
*

4.1. Trail Mountain agrees to pay all royalties or
other charges due on the underlying lease between the Estate and
the State of Utah, to the State of Utah, the United States, or
any other party to whom such royalties are owing to the full
extent of such obligation, including any minimum annual payment
required, as it becomes due, and all per ton royalty charges,
at "a rate then being in effect. Payments under this paragraph
4.1 shall not reduce or otherwise affect the royalty to be
paid under paragraph 2 of this sublease.
4.2. Trail Mountain shall furnish to the Estate
periodic statements demonstrating Trail Mountain's compliance
with its obligation to make royalty payments on the underlying
lease, and compliance with similar such obligations.
5. Indemnification of the Estate. It is distinctly
understood and agreed by Trail Mountain that it alone is
responsible for any and all costs and liabilities incurred in
its mining operations on the leased premises, and Trail Mountain
hereby releases and forever discharges the Estate, its successors and assigns from all damages and liability for damages
from water, gas or other causes whatsoever that might be or
would be done by the mining operations of Trail Mountain. Trail
Mountain agrees to indemnify the Estate and its successors and
assigns from any and all loss, damage, cost, charge or expense,
whether direct or indirect, and whether to persons or property,
to which the Estate and its successors and assigns may be
subjected by reason of any action, omission, or default of Trail
Mountain or any of Trail Mountain's contractors, subcontractors,
or any of its ox its contractor's or subcontractor's officers,
agents or employees.
6. Insurance. Trail Mountain agrees to carry liability
insurance covering its mining operations on the leased premises,
and to furnish the Estate with a certificate of its agent showing
such to be in force. Said insurance shall have limits of at
least $250,000 for any one person and $500,000 for any one
accident for personal injury, and limit of at least $250,000 for

prc?*rv/ car.2ce. Trail Mountain shall see that such coverage
renins in fcrce for the duration of any leaseholds granted*
hereunder.
7. Taxes. Trail Mountain shall pay as additional
renatl, all taxes, levies, assessments or other charges in the
nature thereof, imposed by the State of Utah or any political
subdivision thereof, as to surface lands, upon any improvements
made by Trail Mountain thereon or upon equipment used upon thePremises, and as to coal lanes, any and all rfcal estate, severance
or other taxes upon coal in place, or as removed, which-.may be
attributable thereto. Further, Trail Mountain shall pay any
taxes imposed by'the Federal, state or any local government on
production of coal where such taxes are based on the number*pf
tons of coal produced, used, transferred or sold, etc., including
without limitation, the Federal reclamation fees and the Federal
black lung excise tax.
8* Default. In the event Trail Mountain fails to
make payment of any tonnage royalty installment-due hereunder,
any other payment due hereunder, or should it become insolvent
or bankrupt, or should it attempt to assign away" i^ts* ri"ghts
under this sublease, it shall be in default and the Estate shall
have the option to declare this sublease cancelled, and reenter
and take control of the Premises, and/or seek its legal remedy^
as necessary.
9. Binding Effect. This Agreement shall be binding
upon and shall inure to the benefit of the parties hereto and
their respective successors and assigns.
IN WITNESS WHEREOE, the parties have caused this Agreement to be signed this ^^/A£ay of January, 19 81, effective as
of August 13, 1979.
WITNESS:

ESTATE OF MYRON F. FETTEROLF

~*~

MTTEST:

Inez Lp6 F e t t e r o l f , F ~
Executrix
TRAIL MOUNTAIN COAL COMPANY

cLC SAL

Lnthony/JA. D a l e s s a n d r o ,

Secretary

Louis
President
L
o u i s T.
T. Fiori,
F i o r i , Pr<

_(SEAL)

cc.c::r:i.-_TH or
cs:-~v

PISXSYLVAXIA

OT SOKESSZ?

)
) ssi
)

On the ^i?ffday of January, 19 81, personally appeared
beforeroeInez Lou Fetterolf, Executrix of the Estate of Myron
f. Fetterolf, signer of the above instrument, who duly acknowledced
toroethat she executed the same for and on behalf of said

Notary Public

J* \

MV Commission Expires:
J

WRZJ
KJ19Y. NOU&r PUBLIC
SOMERSET TWF. S0V£RS£T COUNTY
M COMMISSION EXPIRES KAR 3. 1983

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

)

COUNTY OF SOMERSET

)

)

SS:

On this
of January, 19 81, personally appeared
beforeroeLouis TTFlori and Anthony A. Dalessandro, who being
duly sworn did say, each for himself, that they are the designated
officers of Trail Mountain Coal Company, a Utah corporation,
and are authorized to execute this Agreement and have executed
the sme for and on behalf of said corporation.

Notary P u b l i c
Hy expromission E x p i r e s :
time* KIIBT. wo:;ar PUBLIC
SOMERSET TWF, SOMERSET COUNTY
MY CGW.SS'GN IXMIS 1M. 3. 13B3
l^rmbtr. Ptir.S|tor.ij tacrilo of Motorics
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